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ABSTRACT
The dissertation includes two sections, which apply dynamic economic models to
study different economic issues.
The Section Two studies the optimal design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, which was
signed by the U.S. and Canada in 1999 to share salmon on the Pacific coast. Moral hazard
exists because countries may steal from each other. If a country’s observed output is sus-
piciously too high, the treaty either reduces the country’s future share, or asks the country
to make a monetary transfer to its opponent. A calibrated version of our model shows that
it is optimal for the U.S. to pay Canada $327.58 million every 30.68 years. Switching to
the optimal contract improves the total welfare by 1.54%.
The Section Three studies Chinese housing market.China’s housing price has been
growing steadily over the past decade, despite the fact that capital return has fallen dra-
matically. In a rational bubble framework, the fast growth rate of housing price implies
a risk of the burst of housing bubble. We study the impact of bubble burst on China’s
economy, where the government’s infrastructure investment, largely funded by land sale,
is excessive. Our calibrated model shows that if the bubble bursts in 2017, then in the short
run GDP growth rate falls to 2.3% due to the hit to the housing sector, but GDP in the long
run exceeds that under the bubble because excessive infrastructure investment is no longer
sustainable. If the bubble remains, however, implementing property tax will reduce its size
and increase long-run output.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The main focus of my doctoral research is to apply different techniques in economic
dynamics to study some important public policies. The first work uses dynamic mecha-
nism design approach to study the Pacific Salmon Treaty, which was signed by the U.S.
and Canada. We find switching to the optimal contract improves the total welfare by
1.54%. The second work tries to use a dynamic rational bubble model to explain the high
growth of Chinese housing price and the falling capital return. We find if the asset bubble
was to burst in 2017, then in the short run China’s GDP would fall by 3.5 percent due to
the hit to the housing sector, but GDP in the long run would exceed that under the bubble
because excessive infrastructure investment would no longer be sustainable.
In the first research applies dynamic-contract method in studying Pacific Salmon Treaty.
which was signed by the U.S. and Canada in 1999 to share salmon on the Pacific coast.
Moral hazard exists because countries may steal from each other. If a country’s observed
output is suspiciously too high, the treaty either reduces the country’s future share, or asks
the country to make a monetary transfer to its opponent. A calibrated version of our model
shows that it is optimal for the U.S. to pay Canada $327.58 million every 30.68 years.
Switching to the optimal contract improves the total welfare by 1.54%. Also in this pa-
per, we have theoretical contribution on continuous-time game theory. Sannikov (2007)
shows that the boundary of the set of equilibrium payoffs satisfies a differential equation.
However, the differential equation is not easy to solve because its boundary condition is
unknown and needs to be obtained by trial and error. The boundary condition in our setup
is given by smooth pasting conditions. Under smooth pasting conditions, we show that the
optimality equation admits only two solutions. This greatly simplifies the calculation of
the set of equilibrium payoffs.
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In the second research, I apply asset pricing model in studying China’s housing market.
China’s housing price has been growing fast and steadily over the past decade, despite the
fact that capital return has fallen dramatically. In my job-market paper Boom and Bust in
China’s Housing Market. I build a rational bubble model to answer two important ques-
tions: 1) what is the consequence of a housing market crash? and 2) how does the adoption
of property tax affect housing market? Our calibrated model shows that if the bubble was
to burst in 2017, then in the short run ChinaâA˘Z´s GDP would fall by 3.5 percent due to
the hit to the housing sector, but GDP in the long run would exceed that under the bubble
because excessive infrastructure investment, which is largely funded by land sales, would
no longer be sustainable. We also find that if the bubble remains, however, implementing
a property tax will reduce the size of the bubble and increase long-run output.
2
2. ON THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
2.1 Introduction
Pacific salmon are a resource shared by the United States and Canada. In both coun-
tries, salmon are bred in rivers, streams, and lakes. After hatching, they go downriver to
the ocean, and live there for years before returning to the freshwater habitats to spawn and
die. In the ocean, salmon migrate across international boundaries, passing through coastal
areas of Oregon, Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska. As a result, U.S. fishers
inevitably intercept salmon originally from Canada, and vice versa.
The two countries have a long history of squabbling over their respective shares of the
catch. In 1995, the state of Alaska defended its catch of sockeye (a high value species
of salmon) originating in British Columbia using an argument unsupported by the United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention.1 Canada proposed third-party binding arbitration,
but the U.S. opposed. In July 1997, after the Canadian government accused the U.S. of
aggressive fishery, angry Canadian fishermen blockaded the Alaskan ferry Malaspina with
200 fishing vessels, preventing it from leaving the Prince Rupert port in British Columbia.2
In an effort to end the escalating fish war, the two governments entered into a long-term
fishing agreement under the Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1999.3
This paper studies the optimal design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. It features two
countries sharing a natural resource under moral hazard in an infinite-horizon model. At
time zero, countries sign a contract/treaty to specify the sharing rule in all future dates.
1This “pasturage” argument is that salmon originating in British Columbia spend part of their life cycle
within U.S. waters (see [1]). However, Article 66(1) of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention states
that “States in whose rivers anadromous species originate shall have the primary interest in and responsibility
for such stocks.”
2Another violent incident happened in May 1997, when three U.S. commercial fishing vessels were
arrested for failing to comply with Canadian regulations while in Canadian waters.
3The original Pacific Salmon Treaty was signed in 1985, but it was ill-designed and poorly enforced. See
Appendix A for a brief history of the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
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Afterwards, they play a continuous-time hidden-action game a la [2], where the public
signal is the sum of hidden action and some Brownian motion shock, and hidden action
is modeled as countries deviating from the pre-specified sharing rule and stealing from
each other. There are two instruments in the contract to prevent stealing. If a country’s
observed output is suspiciously too high or its opponent’s output is suspiciously too low,
the contract may (1) reduce the country’s future share, and (2) ask the country to make a
monetary transfer to its opponent. We allow both instruments to be fully history dependent.
Our assumptions of moral hazard and side payment are motivated by the data. First,
stealing in our model corresponds to the behavior in reality that a country intercepts
more salmon than what the Pacific Salmon Treaty specifies. Over interception cannot
be perfectly detected because both countries’ fishing weights are affected by large ran-
dom shocks such as climate change.4 Second, the U.S. has made two payments to Canada
since 1999, with an average payment of $56.31 million. Since Canada’s value added from
salmon is only $6.16 million per year, side payments have played an important role in
compensating Canada’s loss so that Canada does not walk away.
There are two main results in this paper: one is theoretical and the other is empirical.
Our theoretical result is on continuous-time game theory. [2] shows that the boundary of
the set of equilibrium payoffs satisfies a differential equation (i.e., the optimality equa-
tion). However, the differential equation is not easy to solve because its boundary condi-
tion is unknown and needs to be obtained by trial and error. Thanks to the possibility of
side payment, the boundary condition in our setup is given by smooth pasting conditions.
Under smooth pasting conditions, we show that the optimality equation admits only two
solutions. This greatly simplifies the calculation of the set of equilibrium payoffs.
Our empirical result recommends a policy change in the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Be-
4The coefficients of variation of salmon catching weights in the U.S. and Canada are, respectively,
13.37% and 43.56%.
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cause the U.S. production function is more efficient than Canada’s, we find that the optimal
contract assigns a bigger share of salmon to the U.S. than the current treaty does. Making
this change will improve the total welfare of both countries by 1.54%.
Although we only study the sharing of Pacific salmon between the U.S. and Canada
in the paper, international fishery sharing agreements are actually very common. In the
database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, there are 1927
agreements registered (over 300 of which are signed by the U.S.) and the earliest can be
traced back to the year 1351. Many agreements involve disputes. For instance, disputes
have occurred multiple times between Australia and New Zealand in the South Tasman
Rise Trawl fishery, and also between the United Kingdom and Iceland in the North Atlantic
cod fishery. Moreover, the issue of sharing natural resources with side payment goes
beyond fisheries. In an international river-sharing agreement, the upstream country of
the Syr Darya River, Kyrgyzstan, agreed to increase summer discharges to supply to the
downstream country, Uzbekistan, in exchange for fossil fuel transfers.
Related literature There are two theories of incentives in the literature on dynamic
games and contracts. One emphasizes variations of continuation payoff as an incentive
device and the other emphasizes side payments. [3] and [2] develop methods for solving
moral-hazard repeated games, in discrete time and continuous time, respectively. In these
games, the only incentive is provided by the sensitivity of continuation payoffs to signals
about players’ actions. Moreover, the folk theorem states that such incentive is strong
enough to support any individual-rational payoff as an equilibrium outcome, when players
are patient. On the other hand, recent papers on relational contracts (e.g., [4], [5], [6], [7])
emphasize the role played by side payments. They show that, when people are risk neutral
and side payments are possible, optimal contracts (or efficient equilibria) are stationary,
i.e., the same payment scheme and action profile are repeated in every period. In stationary
contracts (or equilibria), side payments completely crowd out variation of continuation
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payoffs as an incentive device, because continuation payoffs are fixed. Our paper bridges
the above two theories by incorporating side payments into a continuous-time game built
on [2]. Both incentives are utilized in our model: continuation payoffs vary with public
signals at all times, while side payments are used only when one player’s participation
constraint binds. In contrast to relational contracts where people “settle up” with side
payments each period, payments are used less frequently in our model because payments
are costless in relational contracts, but costly here.
Our paper is related to a large literature on the tragedy of the commons (e.g., [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [13]). When a resource is shared by many individuals, a tragedy
of the commons occurs because an individual does not internalize the effect that his or
her extraction reduces future stock of the resource, and hence reduces the welfare of other
individuals. Consequently, the equilibrium level of extraction is more than what is socially
optimal. Our paper differs from this literature because we assume a fixed stock of salmon
over time, and thus the issue of over-extraction does not exist. This simplifying assumption
is supported by the fact that the salmon stock has been well preserved since 1999 (see
the last paragraph of Appendix A). Another difference is that while the tragedy-of-the-
commons literature typically assumes away hidden action/moral hazard, hidden action
plays an important role in our model: without it, side payments are no longer needed as an
incentive device in our optimal contract.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 studies the model under linear cost
for side payment. The main result is that the optimality equation admits two solutions.
Section 2.3 extends the model to the case with fixed cost for side payment. We calibrate
the fixed-cost model and find that the welfare gain of switching to the optimal contract is
1.54%. Section 2.4 concludes. Appendix A provides a brief history of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty, Appendix B has additional calibration details, and Appendix C contains proofs of
all the results.
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2.2 Model
Two players share a natural resource through long-term contracting at time zero. If the
players sign a contract, then after time zero they participate in a repeated game with moral
hazard in continuous time; otherwise, they receive outside options u1 and u2, respectively.
Before solving the contracting problem at time zero, we shall first describe the details of
the repeated game after time zero.
At each time t ∈ [0,∞), there is one unit of natural resource to be shared. If player 1
gets share x ∈ [0, 1], then player 2 gets 1−x. The players’ payoffs are, respectively, p1(x)
and p2(x), where p1 is strictly increasing and concave in x, and p2 is strictly decreasing
and concave in x.
Moral hazard exists because players may steal the natural resource from their oppo-
nents. If player i steals, then player j loses 1 + µ dollars whenever player i gains 1 dollar.
We can interpret µ > 0 as additional damages to player j’s environment caused by illegal
extraction. If the two players’ payoffs are (p1(xt), p2(xt)) and their stealing efforts are
(e1t, e2t), then their utility flows are:
(p1(xt) + e1t)dt+ (−(1 + µ)e2tdt+ σ1dZ1t),
(p2(xt) + e2t)dt+ (−(1 + µ)e1tdt+ σ2dZ2t).
Here, Z1t and Z2t are two independent standard Brownian motions that represent the un-
certainty in the environment, and (σ1, σ2) measure the size of uncertainty.5
Players’ actions (e1t, e2t) are private (i.e., eit is not observable by player j), but their
utility flows are public. The public history at time t contains the observed utility flows
5We have modeled stealing as players stealing each other’s payoffs rather than the underlying resource.
A more realistic model would specify players’ utilities as p1(xt+ e1t− (1 +µ)e2t)dt+σ1dZ1t and p2(xt+
(1 + µ)e1t − e2t)dt + σ2dZ2t. Our specification makes it easier to calibrate µ in Section 2.3.2, because
financial gains and losses due to illegal fishing are reported in dollar amounts, not in physical units of the
resource (such as tons in the fishing industry).
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before t and is captured by the filtration {Ft}. Because player 1 knows both his utility
flow and his action e1t, he can infer (−(1 + µ)e2tdt + σ1dZ1t), but he cannot distinguish
−(1 + µ)e2tdt from the uncertainty σ1dZ1t. In other words, if player 1 experiences a year
of low output, he does not know whether it is due to player 2’s stealing, or unfavorable
climate change in that year.
We allow for side payments between the two players. In particular, if player i pays qi
to player j, then the total expense for player i is (1 + τ)qi, where τ > 0 represents a linear
transaction cost. Player i’s discounted payoff is
Wi = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt ((pit + eit − (1 + µ)ejt − (1 + τ)qit + qjt)dt+ σidZit)
]
(2.1)
= E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt ((pit + eit − (1 + µ)ejt)dt− (1 + τ)dQit + dQjt + σidZit)
]
,
where r > 0 is the discount rate and Qit :=
∫ t
0
qisds is the cumulative payment by player
i up to time t.
A long-term contract that the two players enter at time zero specifies a sharing-rule
process x = {xt; t ≥ 0}, action processes e = {(e1t, e2t); t ≥ 0} for the players to take,
and side-payment processes Q = {(Q1t, Q2t); t ≥ 0}. Processes (x, e,Q) must be adapted
to the public information available to the players, {Ft}.
2.2.1 Incentive compatibility
Because actions (e1t, e2t) are not publicly observable, contracts will have to satisfy
incentive compatibility constraints. A contract is incentive compatible (IC) if stealing
cannot make the players better off. We will express IC constraints using the following
results of [2].
For any contract (x, e,Q), define its associated continuation payoff process W =
6
{(W1t,W2t); t ≥ 0} as
Wit := E
[ ∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t)
(
(pis + eis − (1 + µ)ejs)ds− (1 + τ)dQis
+dQjs + σidZis
)]
. (2.2)
There exists a process βi = {(βi1t , βi2t ); t ≥ 0} such that the continuation payoffs evolve
as
dWit = r(Wit − (pit + eit − (1 + µ)ejt))dt+ r(1 + τ)dQit − rdQjt
+rβi1t dZ1t + rβ
i2
t dZ2t, i = 1, 2.
Here, βijt represents the sensitivity of player i’s continuation payoffWit to player j’s signal
(i.e., player j’s observed output). The IC constraint for player i is, for all t ≥ 0 and e˜i ≥ 0,
eit + β
ii
t eit − (1 + µ)βijt eit ≥ e˜i + βiit e˜i − (1 + µ)βijt e˜i.
This means
1 + βiit − (1 + µ)βijt ≤ 0, (2.3)
with equality if eit > 0.
2.2.2 The set of continuation payoffs
Since players have outside options (u1, u2), their continuation payoffs in any contract
must satisfy the participation constraint:
Wit ≥ ui, ∀t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (2.4)
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For convenience, we can define A := {(w1, w2) : w1 ≥ u1, w2 ≥ u2} and write the
participation constraint as (W1t,W2t) ∈ A.
Let E be the set of continuation payoff pairs achieved by all IC contracts, i.e.,
E := {(W1t,W2t) ∈ A : (W1t,W2t) satisfies (2.2) for some IC contract}.
The following lemma shows that E is monotonic: if (w1, w2) belongs to E , then the vectors
below (w1, w2) also belong to E . In particular, (u1, u2) ∈ E .
Lemma 1. If (w1, w2) ∈ E and for some Q1 ≥ 0 and Q2 ≥ 0,
w˜1 = w1 − r(1 + τ)Q1 + rQ2 ≥ u1,
w˜2 = w2 − r(1 + τ)Q2 + rQ1 ≥ u2,
then (w˜1, w˜2) ∈ E .
The proof of this lemma is straightforward. Suppose at time 0 a contract lets player i pay
Qi to his opponent and restarts from (w1, w2). This contract delivers payoff w1 − r(1 +
τ)Q1 + rQ2 to player 1 and w2 − r(1 + τ)Q2 + rQ1 to player 2, thus (w˜1, w˜2) ∈ E .
The next subsection studies the boundary of E , which we denote as ∂E .
2.2.3 Pareto frontier
This subsection shows that ∂E consists of three portions: a horizontal portion, a vertical
portion, and a downward sloping portion.
We first characterize the horizontal portion and the vertical portion of ∂E . Define
u1 := max{w1 : (w1, u2) ∈ E}, u2 := max{w2 : (u1, w2) ∈ E}. (2.5)
That is, ui is the highest payoff for player iwhen player j’s payoff is at the minimum. Then
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the horizontal portion and vertical portion of ∂E are, respectively, {(w1, u2) : u1 ≤ w1 ≤
u1} and {(u1, w2) : u2 ≤ w2 ≤ u2}. To see that these boundaries are non-degenerate,
we need to show ui < ui. Pick w ∈ E such that w 6= (u1, u2). Lemma 1 states that if
Q1 =
w1−u1
r(1+τ)
and Q2 = 0, then (w˜1, w˜2) = (u1, w2 + (w1 − u1)/(1 + τ)) ∈ E . Therefore,
u2 < w2 + (w1 − u1)/(1 + τ) ≤ u2.
Similarly, we can show that u1 < u1.
Then, we study the portion of the boundary from (u1, u2) to (u1, u2). This portion stays
above the straight line connecting the two points because E is convex. We show below that
this boundary is downward sloping.
Let T(w) and N(w) be the unit tangent and outward normal vectors to ∂E at a boundary
pointw. If θ is the angle between N(w) and the x-axis, then T(w) = (− sin(θ), cos(θ)) and
N(w) = (cos(θ), sin(θ)). To see that the boundary from (u1, u2) to (u1, u2) is downward
sloping, it is sufficient to show that the slope of the boundary, − cos(θ)
sin(θ)
, satisfies
−(1 + τ) ≤ −cos(θ)
sin(θ)
≤ −(1 + τ)−1. (2.6)
Lemma 1 states that (w1−r(1+τ)Q1, w2+rQ1) ∈ E , (w1+rQ2, w2−r(1+τ)Q2) ∈ E for
Q1 ∈ [0, w1−u1r(1+τ) ] and Q2 ∈ [0, w2−u2r(1+τ) ]. Since the convex set E is either above or below the
tangent line atw, we know that (w1−r(1+τ)Q1, w2+rQ1) and (w1+rQ2, w2−r(1+τ)Q2)
stay on the same side of the tangent line. This implies (2.6).
Since the boundary from (u1, u2) to (u1, u2) is downward sloping, we can define the
mapping from w1 to w2 as f(·). Function f(·) represents the Pareto frontier of E because
w2 = f(w1) is the highest payoff for player 2 if player 1’s payoff is w1 ∈ [u1, u1].
In the following analysis, we further characterize the Pareto frontier as the solution to
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some differential equation.
2.2.4 Restriction to no stealing
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to contracts that recommend no stealing, i.e., e1t =
e2t = 0 for all t. Under the following assumption, this restriction is without loss of
generality.
Assumption 1. Stealing is more costly than making a transfer through side payments, i.e.,
µ ≥ τ .
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, it is optimal to recommend e1t = e2t = 0 for all t.
Two remarks regarding the assumption are in order. First, data suggest that stealing is
costly. In Section 2.3.2, we calibrate µ to be 0.84, which seems to be much larger than
typical costs associated with money transfer. Second, even if Assumption 1 is violated, a
treaty that allows countries to steal might be too controversial to be politically viable.
2.2.5 Optimality equation for the Pareto frontier
[2] shows that, at any point w on the Pareto frontier, the sensitivities βi = (βi1, βi2) in
the IC constraints are given by a vector of tangential volatilities (φ1, φ2) as follows:
 β11 β12
β21 β22
 =
 − sin(θ)φ1 sin(θ)φ2
cos(θ)φ1 − cos(θ)φ2
 . (2.7)
Furthermore, the curvature of the boundary at w satisfies the following optimality equa-
tion:
κ(w) = max
x∈[0,1],
q1≥0,q2≥0
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x)) + q1(−1− τ, 1) + q2(1,−1− τ)− w)
r|φ(θ)|2 ,
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where |φ(θ)|2 is given by
|φ(θ)|2 = min
φ1,φ2
σ21φ
2
1 + σ
2
2φ
2
2
subject to (2.3), (2.7).
Lemma 3 below shows that both |φ(θ)|2 and the optimal x in the optimality equation
can be solved explicitly. This result greatly simplifies the analysis in the next subsection.
Lemma 3. 1. The optimal (φ1, φ2) is given by
(φ1, φ2) =

(
σ22
sin(θ)(σ22+(1+µ)
2σ21)
,
(1+µ)σ21
sin(θ)(σ22+(1+µ)
2σ21)
)
, if θ ∈ (0, θ1];(
1+µ
cos(θ)
− 1
sin(θ)
(1+µ)2−1 ,
1+µ
sin(θ)
− 1
cos(θ)
(1+µ)2−1
)
, if θ ∈ [θ1, θ2];(
(1+µ)σ22
cos(θ)(σ21+(1+µ)
2σ22)
,
σ21
cos(θ)(σ21+(1+µ)
2σ22)
)
, if θ ∈ [θ2, pi2 ),
where θ1 := arctan
(
(σ21+σ
2
2)(1+µ)
σ22+(1+µ)
2σ21
)
and θ2 := arctan
(
σ21+(1+µ)
2σ22
(σ21+σ
2
2)(1+µ)
)
.
2. The optimal x∗ is uniquely pinned down by cos(θ)p′1(x
∗) + sin(θ)p′2(x
∗) = 0 for any
θ.
Remark 1. Both φ1 and φ2 are positive in Lemma 3. This and (2.7) imply that βii < 0
but βji > 0. That is, when player i’s output is higher than the expectation (dZit > 0),
then player i is punished (both his continuation value Wit and his future share of salmon
decrease), while player j is rewarded. This property of the model is consistent with what
we observe in the data. In 2001, the Pacific Salmon Treaty reallocated 57,000 sockeye
salmon in Fraser River (about 3.7% of the total allowable catch) from the U.S. to Canada,
because the U.S. catch was excessive in 2000.6
We can simplify the right-hand side of the optimality equation by removing q1 and q2
6See the 17th Annual Report of the Pacific Salmon Commission.
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from the numerator. Since θ satisfies (2.6),
N(θ)(−1− τ, 1) = −(1 + τ) cos(θ) + sin(θ) ≤ 0,
N(θ)(1,−1− τ) = cos(θ)− (1 + τ) sin(θ) ≤ 0.
Therefore, the optimal solutions in the maximization problems maxq1≥0 N(θ)(−1−τ, 1)q1
and maxq2≥0 N(θ)(1,−1 − τ)q2 can be set as q1 = 0 and q2 = 0.7 Then the optimality
equation reduces to
κ(w) = max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− w)
r|φ(θ)|2 .
2.2.6 Solving the optimality equation
This subsection characterizes solutions to the optimality equation.
On the boundary, the Pareto frontier must satisfy the smooth pasting conditions:
f ′(w1 = u1) = −(1 + τ)−1,
f ′(w1 = u1) = −(1 + τ).
Smooth pasting conditions are imposed because w1t is a regulated diffusion process that
stays within the domain [u1, u1]: if w1t ∈ (u1, u1), we have argued earlier that side pay-
ments (q1, q2) are not used; if w1t reaches either u1 or u1, side payments are just enough
to keep w1t inside the interval [u1, u1].
8 9 Because f ′(w1) = − 1tan(θ) , the smooth pasting
7This argument applies only in the interior of the Pareto frontier, i.e., when w1 > u1 and w2 > u2. If
wi = ui, then player i must pay to avoid his participation constraint being violated.
8See chapter 10 in [14] for a detailed discussion of regulated process. We have proven rigorously that
side payments in the optimal contract are just enough to keep w1t inside the interval [u1, u1]. This proof is
available upon request.
9Because w2t = f(w1t) and w1t is regulated to stay in [u1, u1] at all times, our continuation payoff pair
(w1t, w2t) is always on the Pareto frontier, meaning that our contract is renegotiation-proof. In contrast,
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conditions can be expressed in terms of θ:
θ = θ := arctan(1 + τ), if w1 = u1, (2.8)
θ = θ := arctan((1 + τ)−1), if w1 = u1. (2.9)
If l denotes the distance of the Pareto frontier from (u1, u2) to w, then we can refor-
mulate the optimality equation by writing all other variables as functions of l:
dw1(l)
dl
= − sin(θ(l)), (2.10)
dw2(l)
dl
= cos(θ(l)), (2.11)
dθ(l)
dl
= max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− w)
r|φ(θ)|2 . (2.12)
In the rest of this section, we shall characterize the solutions to (2.10)-(2.12) under the
smooth pasting conditions.10 Our main result is that the system admits two solutions, and
the outer solution is the true Pareto frontier. This result greatly simplifies the search for
the Pareto frontier.
In particular, the construction of a solution takes the following three steps. First, we
guess a value of u1 and then solve (2.10)-(2.12) using the initial conditions (w1, w2, θ) =
(u1, u2, θ). Second, we show that there exists L such that w1(L) = u1. In other words, the
solution curve will cross the vertical straight line Y := {(u1, w2) : w2 ∈ R} at some point.
Third, we check the smooth pasting condition (2.8) at l = L, i.e., θ(L) = θ. We can show
that there are only two values of u1 starting from which θ(L) = θ.
equilibria in [2] are not necessarily renegotiation-proof because his payoff pair may move to a boundary
point below the Pareto frontier.
10Note that the cost of side payments, τ , affects the boundary conditions of (2.10)-(2.12), although τ does
not enter the system explicitly. We can show that a lower τ moves the Pareto frontier up and to the right, and
hence the set of continuation payoffs expands with better side-payment technology. This is consistent with
findings in [15], [16], and [17] that side payments could make collusion/cooperation easier.
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(u1, u2)
{(p1(x), p2(x)) : x ∈ [0, 1]}
(p1(x), p2(x))
slope=−(1 + τ)
(u1, u2)
Line X
Line Y
Figure 2.1: u1 is an upper bound for u1.
In order to search for u1, we first need to find its range. The following lemma provides
an upper bound for u1. Consider the tangent line of slope−(1+ τ) in Figure 2.1. This line
is tangential to the curve {(p1(x), p2(x)) : x ∈ [0, 1]} at point (p1(x), p2(x)) and intersects
the horizontal straight line X := {(w1, u2) : w1 ∈ R} at (u1 := p1(x) + (p2(x)−u2)/(1 +
τ), u2).
11 The following lemma shows that our guess of u1 cannot exceed u1.
Lemma 4. If (W1,W2) is the pair of promised payoffs delivered by some contract and
W2 = u2, then W1 ≤ u1.
By Lemma 4, the appropriate range of u1 is [u1, u1]. When u1 is in this range, the so-
lution to (2.10)-(2.12) starting from (w1, w2, θ) = (u1, u2, θ) exists and is unique, because
the right-hand sides of (2.10)-(2.12) are Lipschitz continuous (Lemma C.1 in Appendix C
11x is given by the condition
p′2(x)
p′1(x)
= −(1 + τ).
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verifies the Lipschitz continuity).
The next lemma shows that the solution to (2.10)-(2.12) always crosses the vertical
straight line Y. This result is not surprising because the Pareto frontier is concave, that is,
the frontier becomes flatter as w1 decreases (see Lemma C.2 in Appendix C for a proof).
Intuitively, if the solution to (2.10)-(2.12) never hits the vertical Y, it must bend upward as
w1 approaches u1.
Lemma 5. The solution curve starting from (w1, w2, θ) = (u1, u2, θ) crosses Y once for
u1 ∈ [u1, u1]. In other words, there exists a unique L ≥ 0 such that w1(L) = u1.
If a curve starts from (w1, w2, θ) = (u1, u2, θ), denote the angle of the curve when
it crosses Y, θ(L), as Θ(u1). Theorem 1 shows that Θ(u1) is first increasing and then
decreasing in u1.
Theorem 1. Θ(u1) is single-peaked. That is, there exists a u∗1 such that Θ is strictly
increasing in [u1, u
∗
1] and strictly decreasing in [u
∗
1, u1].
The intuition for the single-peakedness in Theorem 1 is as follows. We can express
Θ(u1) as
Θ(u1) = θ(L) = θ +
∫ L
0
θ′(l)dl = θ + Lκ,
where κ is the average curvature of the solution curve. The length of the Pareto frontier,
L, is increasing in u1 while the curvature κ is decreasing in u1: as u1 increases, the Pareto
frontier moves outward and its length L increases, but the larger payoff pair w reduces the
term ((p1(x), p2(x)) − w) in the optimality equation and hence reduces the curvature of
the Pareto frontier (see Figure 2.2). Moreover, if u1 takes the smallest value of u1, then
L = 0 because the starting point of the curve is on Y and the curve is degenerate; if u1
15
κu1
L
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Figure 2.2: Lκ is first increasing and then decreasing in u1.
takes the largest value of u1, then the solution curve is a straight line: its curvature is zero
because maxx∈[0,1] N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− w) is everywhere zero.
Because L and κ move in opposite directions and Θ(u1) depends on the product of
the two, the slope of Θ depends on whether L or κ moves faster, in percentage terms. If
u1 ≈ u1, then L moves faster in percentage terms than κ because L is close to zero. On
the other hand, κ moves faster when u1 ≈ u1 and κ is close to zero. Therefore, Θ is first
increasing when L dominates and then decreasing when κ dominates.
Theorem 1 immediately implies the following:
Corollary 1. Only two solutions to (2.10)-(2.12) satisfy the smooth pasting conditions
(2.8)-(2.9).
It is useful to relate our result to the repeated-game literature. In discrete-time repeated
games, [3] show that the equilibrium set of continuation payoffs, E , is a fixed point of some
operator that maps the set of future continuation payoffs into the set of current continua-
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tion payoffs. To compute E , they start with a superset of E and iterate on a sequence of
sets until the sequence converges to E . This iteration procedure, however, is time consum-
ing. In a continuous-time setting, [2] shows that the boundary of E solves a second-order
differential equation (i.e., the optimality equation). Sannikov’s continuous-time method
has an advantage over the discrete-time method because solving differential equations is
numerically easier than computing the operator in [3]. The disadvantage, however, is that
finding the initial condition for the optimality equation is difficult. When there are multi-
ple initial conditions (starting from which the solution curve forms the boundary of some
set), it is hard to tell which initial condition is correct.12 Presumably, we need to find the
largest set whose boundary solves the optimality equation, but this process is one of trial
and error.
Our paper moves forward the analysis in [2] in two aspects. First, our initial condition
is given by the smooth pasting conditions, thanks to the technology of side payments in
our model. Second, under the smooth pasting conditions, only two solutions exist for
the optimality equation. The two solutions can be easily distinguished because Θ′(u1) is
positive for the inner solution but negative for the outer solution. The latter represents the
true Pareto frontier because it is the boundary of a bigger set.
2.3 Model with fixed cost
Despite being analytically tractable, the linear-cost model in Section 2.2 has one draw-
back: it predicts that payments are made infinitely many times and each payment is in-
finitesimal.13 This prediction is inconsistent with the data, because the actual payments in
the Pacific Salmon Treaty are both infrequent and large (more details are in Section 2.3.2).
12To make matters worse, the number of initial conditions is typically unknown a priori.
13Payments are made whenever W1t reaches the boundary of [u1, u1]. Since W1t is a diffusion process,
on the one hand it reaches the boundary of [u1, u1] infinitely many times, but on the other hand it stays at the
boundary for zero amount of time. It is merely an artifact of the continuous-time setup that infinitely many
payments can be made in no time.
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To better capture the payment frequency and amount, this section studies a model where
payment incurs a fixed cost C > 0. In particular, if player i makes a payment Q to player
j, then their payoffs are −Q − C
2
and Q − C
2
, respectively. Our assumption that play-
ers equally share the fixed cost is convenient but not essential for the following analysis.
Facing the fixed cost, players pay only occasionally in the optimal contract.
2.3.1 Pareto frontier
Our focus is still on the equilibrium set of payoffs E and its boundary ∂E . Similar to
the linear-cost case, ∂E contains a horizontal portion, a vertical portion, and a downward
sloping portion (see Lemma C.7 in Appendix C for a proof).14 We continue to denote the
Pareto frontier as f : [u1, u1]→ w2. Similar to the linear-cost case, side payments are not
used unless w1 is on the boundary of [u1, u1] (see Lemma C.6 in Appendix C for a proof).
Therefore, the interior of the Pareto frontier still satisfies the ODE in (2.10)-(2.12), which
is the optimality equation with no side payments.
Boundary conditions for the ODE in (2.10)-(2.12) are given by the following value
matching conditions:
u1 + u2 = max
(w1,w2)∈E
w1 + w2 − rC, (2.13)
u1 + u2 = max
(w1,w2)∈E
w1 + w2 − rC. (2.14)
We prove (2.13) in two steps. First, we show u1 + u2 ≥ max(w1,w2)∈E w1 + w2 − rC.
Let (w∗1, w
∗
2) be the solution to max(w1,w2)∈E w1 + w2. Then (w
∗
1 + w
∗
2 − rC − u2, u2) ∈
E , because a contract that first lets player 2 pay Q2 = (w∗2 − u2)/r − C/2 to player 1
and then restarts at (w∗1, w
∗
2) delivers payoff w
∗
2 + r(−Q2 − C/2) = u2 to player 2 and
w∗1 + r(Q2 − C/2) = w∗1 + w∗2 − rC − u2 to player 1. Since u1 is the highest payoff
for player 1 when player 2’s payoff is u2, u1 ≥ w∗1 + w∗2 − rC − u2. Second, we show
14The only exception is that C is so large that E becomes degenerate.
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u1 + u2 ≤ max(w1,w2)∈E w1 + w2 − rC. A contract promising (u1, u2) must ask player 2
to pay player 1, otherwise player 2’s continuation payoff has to follow a diffusion process
and violates his participation constraint with positive probability.15 If (w˜1, w˜2) are the
continuation payoffs after payment, then
u1 + u2 = w˜1 + w˜2 − rC ≤ max
(w1,w2)∈E
w1 + w2 − rC.
The same argument at (u1, u2) yields (2.14).
We can no longer follow the solution procedure in Section 2.2.6 (i.e., conjecture u1
and start the solution curve from (u1, u2, θ)), because we do not know the initial angle θ.
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Below, we propose a procedure that is suitable for the fixed-cost model.
We will need to conjecture two values: (1) the sum of payoffs S := maxw1 w1 +f(w1),
and (2) the optimal w∗1 that satisfies the first-order condition
f ′(w∗1) = −1. (2.15)
The advantage of this procedure is that the angle θ at w∗1 is
pi
4
, thanks to (2.15). This allows
us to solve the solution curve from (w1, w2, θ) = (w∗1, S − w∗1, pi4 ) until it hits one of the
boundaries X, Y.
For each pair (S,w∗1), consider the solution to (2.10)-(2.12) with initial conditions
(w∗1, S − w∗1, pi4 ). The solution curve will cross both X and Y,17 and we denote the inter-
section points as (u1, u2(w
∗
1)) and (u1(w
∗
1), u2), respectively.
Lemma 6. For each S ∈ (u1 + u2,maxx∈[0,1] p1(x) + p2(x)), there is a unique w∗1 ∈
15Because (u1, u2) is an extreme point of the convex set E , it cannot be delivered by any lottery.
16Alternatively, we can conjecture both u1 and θ and search for a solution curve to satisfy (2.13) and
(2.14). This procedure turns out to be numerically unstable because a solution curve never crosses the
straight line Y (hence we cannot check equation (2.14)) whenever the conjectured u1 is too large or θ is too
small.
17This can be shown by an argument similar to that in Lemma 5.
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Figure 2.3: Change of coordinates.
(u1, S − u2) such that u1 + u2(w∗1) = u1(w∗1) + u2.
The unique w∗1 in Lemma 6, which we denote as w
∗
1(S), allows us to reduce two value
matching conditions (2.13)-(2.14) into one equation:
u1 + u2(w
∗
1(S)) = S − rC. (2.16)
How many solutions of S are there in (2.16)? Hinted by the linear-cost case, we
conjecture two solutions. Although we have not been able to prove this result analytically,
all of our numerical examples confirm this conjecture. Below, we offer a proof of this
claim for a special case.
Suppose the two players are symmetric and u1 = u2 = 0. Because the Pareto frontier
is symmetric around the 45-degree line, w∗1 = w
∗
2 = S − w∗1 = S/2. Given the symmetry,
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it is easier to work with new coordinates (X ,Y)
X :=
√
2
2
(w1 − w2), Y :=
√
2
2
(w1 + w2).
That is, the X -axis and Y-axis under the new coordinates correspond to the negative-45-
degree line and the 45-degree line under the old coordinates (see Figure 2.3). We parame-
terize the Pareto frontier as Y = −A
2
X 2 +
√
2
2
S, where A > 0 and S > 0 are parameters to
be determined below. Two things are worth mentioning. First, the parameterized frontier
is symmetric around the Y-axis (i.e., the old 45-degree line). In particular, the peak of
the frontier, (0,
√
2
2
S), corresponds to (w∗1, S − w∗1) = (S/2, S/2) in the old coordinates.
Second, for a given S, it is impossible for the frontier to satisfy the optimality equation at
all points since there is only one free parameter, A. Therefore, we check the optimality
equation only at X = 0,18
A =
−Y ′′(0)(√
1 + (Y ′(0))2
)3 = κ(pi/4) = max
x∈[0,1]
2N(pi/4)((p1(x), p2(x))− (S/2, S/2))
r|φ(pi/4)|2
=
√
2
r|φ(pi/4)|2 (2p(1/2)− S)
=
√
2B(D − S),
where B := 1
r|φ(pi/4)|2 and D := 2p(1/2) are introduced to simplify notations. We derive
(2.16) as follows. At (u1 = 0, u2) in Figure 2.3, substituting (X ,Y) = (−
√
2
2
u2,
√
2
2
u2)
into Y = −A
2
X 2 +
√
2
2
S, we have
u2 =
−
√
2
2
+
√
1
2
+ 4A
4
√
2
2
S
A
2
=
√
1 + 2B(D − S)S − 1
B(D − S) ,
18If one insists on solving the optimality equation everywhere, then there is no closed-form solution.
Without a closed-form solution, it is difficult to check the number of solutions to (2.16).
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where the second equality uses A =
√
2B(D−S). Substituting u1 = 0 and the above into
(2.16) yields
√
1 + 2B(D − S)S − 1
B(D − S) = S − rC. (2.17)
Theorem 2. Equation (2.17) has two solutions of S in (0, D).
Our analysis so far determines the Pareto frontier, but not the initial continuation values
(W10,W20) to start the repeated game. Which point on the Pareto frontier is chosen usually
depends on the players’ bargaining powers. Here, however, we suppose that the game
starts at (w∗1, f(w
∗
1)), i.e., the continuation values after a payment is made in our model.
We can do this because the U.S. paid Canada in 1999.
2.3.2 Calibration
In this section, we will quantitatively evaluate the optimal contract. We first calibrate
the model parameters to match certain observed features of the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
We then compute the gain of switching to the optimal mechanism. Players 1 and 2 are,
respectively, the U.S. and Canada. Throughout this section, our model period is one year
(so the interest rate r is 0.04 in Subsection 2.3.2.3) and our results such as the welfare
gains are measured in 1999 USD.
2.3.2.1 Estimation of µ, p1(·), p2(·)
According to [18], illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing may damage the envi-
ronment and keep fisheries locked in low-value states. They estimate the environmental
cost to be almost 9 billion euros when EU member states lose catches worth 10.7 billion
euros. So we choose the value µ = 9
10.7
= 0.84.
Next, we estimate Canada’s payoff function p2(·). Since our annual time series data
are relatively short, we use monthly data to make our regression more accurate. That is,
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we first estimate the monthly payoff functions, and then we convert monthly payoffs into
an annual payoff. This procedure consists of three steps.
1. Construction of monthly x2t and p2t. In the model, x represents the amount of the
resource and p represents a player’s payoff. In the data, we interpret x as the catching
weight (in pounds) and p as the value added (in 1999 USD), which is defined as gross
revenue minus the cost of intermediate goods such as repairs, gear, food, fuel, etc.
The monthly catching weight for Canada is from Canada’s Department of Fisheries
and Oceans (DFO). The monthly value added for Canada is calculated as 22.5% of
the monthly revenue reported by DFO. Appendix B explains how the value-added
ratio is determined.
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Figure 2.4: Approximately linear relationship between ln(p) and ln(x).
2. Estimation of monthly payoff function. The right panel in Figure 2.4 plots ln(p2t)
against ln(x2t). It shows that ln(p2t) is approximately linear in ln(x2t). Therefore,
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we run the following OLS regression19
ln(p2t) = β2 + α2 ln(x2t) + 2t,
and assume that the monthly payoff function is pm2 (x2t) = e
β2(x2t)
α2 . Our regres-
sion results are in the last row of Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary of OLS regression
Country βˆi αˆi Number of obs
U.S. (i = 1) 0.61 0.90 204
(0.12) (0.01)
Canada (i = 2) 0.05 0.90 175
(0.19) (0.01)
Notes: The U.S. data are provided by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration from 1999 to 2015.
Canada’s data are provided by its Department of Fisheries and Oceans from 1999 to 2014. Data with zero
values are removed from regression.
3. Construction of annual payoff function. We define the annual payoff function as
p2(x2) :=
∑12
k=1 p
m
2 (ρkx2), where p
m
2 (ρkx2) is the payoff in the kth month, and ρk is
the average ratio between the catching weight in the kth month and that in the whole
year.
We follow the same procedure when we estimate p1(·) for the U.S. In doing so, we face
a missing-data problem that Alaska did not report its monthly data after 1998. We solve the
problem as follows. Since the distributions of catching weight and revenue across different
months were stable in Alaska before 1998, we assume that these distributions remain
19We also tried more general functional forms. For example, we added a quadratic term (ln(x2t))2 as
regressor, but found that the results in the following are barely changed.
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unchanged after 1998. We then impute Alaska’s monthly data after 1998 using Alaska’s
annual data and the unchanged distributions. Then, we construct the U.S. monthly data by
aggregating the monthly data of Alaska and those of other states. Finally, we calculate the
U.S. monthly value added as 40.9% of the monthly revenue, run the same linear regression
for the U.S., and report our results in the first row of Table 2.1. Again, Appendix B explains
how we determine the U.S. value-added ratio. The fact that the U.S. has a higher value-
added ratio suggests that the U.S. production function is more efficient than Canada’s, and
this intuition will help us understand the welfare-gain result in Subsection 2.3.2.3.
2.3.2.2 Calibration of (σ1, σ2, u1, u2, C) and the total amount of resource x¯
This subsection calibrates the other six parameters (σ1, σ2, u1, u2, C, x¯). Here x¯ repre-
sents the total amount of resource; in the discussion so far, this amount has been normal-
ized to 1.
Ideally, we want to build an extensive-form bargaining model to describe the forma-
tion of the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST). Then we can calibrate the above six parameters
so that this descriptive model replicates certain attributes of the treaty (payment amount,
frequency, etc.). However, such a model is not immediately available because the bargain-
ing process when the PST was signed in 1999 was not revealed to the public. Without
much information about the actual bargaining process, we find it difficult to discipline any
extensive form, and therefore think the following reduced-form model should serve our
purpose equally well.
Suppose the two countries achieve some payoff pair w ∈ E after signing the PST. We
allow w to be below the Pareto frontier because the PST may not be designed optimally
due to contracting inefficiencies that we do not observe. To capture such inefficiencies, we
assume that both countries have discount rate r˜ greater than r.20 Under a higher discount
20The assumption that government is less patient than the market interest rate is also used in [19]. Polit-
ical economy models (e.g., [20]) provide a justification for this assumption: incumbent politicians behave
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Table 2.2: Calibrated parameters
σ1 σ2 u1 u2 C x¯ r˜
42.61 2.54 116.51 5.57 14.93 416.27 0.16
Notes: (σ1, σ2, u1, u2, C) are measured in 1999 million USD. x¯ is in million pounds.
rate, players are less patient and less willing to cooperate. On the other hand, we continue
to assume that countries behave optimally in other aspects (i.e., sign an optimal contract
under r˜). This way of modeling inefficiency is very parsimonious because all inefficiencies
are embedded in one parameter r˜. We can adjust r˜ so that w /∈ ∂E(r) lies on the Pareto
frontier of a model with discount rate r˜, because the Pareto frontier and E(r˜) shrink in r˜.
More specifically, we calibrate six parameters (σ1, σ2, u1, C, x¯, r˜) to match six targets:
(1) payment amount of the U.S.; (2) payment frequency of the U.S.; (3) mean of the U.S.
payoffs; (4) variance of the U.S. payoffs; (5) mean of Canada’s payoffs; (6) variance of
Canada’s payoffs. Note that we do not calibrate u2, because u2 affects mostly Canada’s
payment amount and frequency, but we have not observed any payment by Canada in our
data set. We simply let u2 satisfy
u2
mean of Canada’s payoffs =
u1
mean of the U.S. payoffs , i.e., Canada’s
outside option is similar to that of the U.S. (relative to their respective equilibrium payoffs).
The calibration results in Table 2.2 are in line with other related estimates. First,
(σ1, σ2) = (42.61, 2.54) is below the standard deviation of the U.S. payoffs and Canada
payoffs because payoff variation contains both random shocks σidZit and the time varying
pi(xt). That σ1  σ2 is not surprising because in the data both the standard deviation
and the mean of the U.S. payoffs are much larger than those of Canada.21 Second, the
outside options (u1, u2) = (116.51, 5.57) correspond to the case that countries receive
impatiently because they may not remain in power in the future.
21But the U.S. coefficient of variation is smaller than Canada’s.
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90% of their average annual income permanently. That is, compared with cooperative
management, taking outside options and being noncooperative reduces countries’ income
by 10%. In the literature, estimates of the loss due to noncooperation range from 3% to
15%.22 Our estimate is well within this range. Third, C is roughly equal to 5.46 years of
operation cost of the Pacific Salmon Commission. Since the majority of the work done
by the commission is to collect data on the salmon species and organize bilateral negotia-
tion meetings, this estimate of C seems reasonable. Fourth, our estimate of x¯ is equal to
95.20% of the two countries’ average catching weight over 1999-2014. The discrepancy
here might be due to the small-sample nature of the latter. Finally, our estimate of r˜ is
significantly higher than r, suggesting that the underlying contracting inefficiencies are far
from negligible.23
2.3.2.3 The optimal contract and its welfare gain
In this subsection, we compute the optimal contract and compare it with the positive
contract in Subsection 2.3.2.2. The two contracts share the same parameter values in Table
2.2 except for the discount rate: r = 0.04 in the optimal contract,24 while r˜ = 0.16 in the
positive one.
First, we compare the U.S. payment amount and frequency in the two contracts. Table
2.3 shows that the U.S. pays more frequently in the positive contract than in the optimal
one. Since each payment incurs C, by paying less frequently the optimal contract incurs
less total fixed cost, making it more efficient than the positive contract. One might wonder
why the positive contract does not do the same (i.e., have a lower payment frequency and
a larger payment amount). This is because under a high discount rate r˜ = 0.16, the present
22See, e.g., [21], [22], [23], and [24].
23If one thinks that our estimate of r˜ is too high to be reasonable, please note that r˜ captures all sources
of inefficiencies. r˜ = 0.16 is chosen to match observables such as the high payment frequency of the U.S.
24We choose r = 0.04 because the implied annual discount factor is 0.96. This discount factor is com-
monly used in macroeconomics research.
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Table 2.3: The U.S. payment amount and frequency
Positive contract Optimal contract
U.S. payment amount $56.31 million $327.58 million
Average duration between
two U.S. payments 10 years 30.68 years
value of paying $327.58 million every 30.68 years is much lower than paying $56.31
million every 10 years, and thus the former payment scheme cannot compensate Canada
sufficiently.
Second, we compare welfare levels achieved by the two contracts. For the opti-
mal contract, instead of reporting total welfare of the two countries as w1 + w2, Ta-
ble 2.4 reports w1+w2
r
. Since w1 + w2 = E
[∫∞
0
re−rt (p1t + p2t) dt−
∑∞
k=1 re
−rtkC
]
,
where tk is the kth payment time, by removing r in the flows and reporting w1+w2r , we
normalize our welfare level to be the standard present value of flows. Furthermore, to
make this comparison meaningful, we calculate welfare in the positive contract using the
same discount rate as in the optimal contract. That is, welfare in the positive contract
is E
[∫∞
0
e−rt (p1t + p2t) dt−
∑∞
k=1 e
−rtkC
]
, although {(p1t, p2t); t ≥ 0} and {tk; k =
1, 2, 3, ...} in the positive contract are derived under the discount rate r˜.
The first row in Table 2.4 shows that switching to the optimal contract improves welfare
by $51.66 million, or about 1.54%. There are two sources of this welfare gain: (1) the
reduction in fixed cost, and (2) the increase in payoff flows. As discussed before, the
optimal contract reduces the total fixed cost by paying less frequently. The second row in
Table 2.4 confirms this: total fixed cost is reduced by $23.79 millon, contributing to 0.71
percentage points in the welfare gain. More importantly, the third row in Table 2.4 shows
that the present value of p1t+p2t is higher by $27.87 millon in the optimal contract, which
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Table 2.4: Change of welfare measured in 1999 million USD
Positive contract Optimal contract Difference
E
[ ∫∞
0
e−rt (p1t + p2t) dt
−∑∞k=1 e−rtkC] 3351.36 3403.02 51.66
E [
∑∞
k=1 e
−rtkC] 29.58 5.78 -23.79
E
[∫∞
0
e−rt (p1t + p2t) dt
]
3380.94 3408.81 27.87
E
[∫∞
0
e−rtp1tdt
]
3226.06 3385.9 159.84
E
[∫∞
0
e−rtp2tdt
]
154.88 22.91 -131.97
contributes to 0.83 percentage points in the welfare gain. Since the increase in p1t + p2t
explains more than half of the welfare gain, in the following we shall try to understand the
reason for this increase.
The last two rows of Table 2.4 report separately the present values of p1t for the U.S.
and p2t for Canada. The U.S. receives more payoff flows in the optimal contract than
in the positive contract, while Canada does the opposite. This implies that the optimal
contract reallocates salmon resources from Canada to the U.S. In fact, the average U.S.
catching weight has increased by 21.4 million pounds moving from the positive contract
to the optimal contract, while Canada’s weight has decreased by the same amount. Note
that the U.S. gains more in terms of value added than Canada loses, so the total payoff
increases after this reallocation. That the U.S. production function is more efficient than
Canada’s is consistent with the earlier observation that the ratio between value added and
revenue is 40.9% in the U.S. but only 22.5% in Canada.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the optimal design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty under two-sided
moral hazard. We extend the theory of continuous-time repeated games to allow for side
29
payments. We view our analysis as making two contributions. First, we show that there
are only two solutions to the optimality equation that characterizes the boundary of the set
of equilibrium payoffs. This technical contribution greatly simplifies the calculation of the
equilibrium set. In the literature, the search for the solution to the optimality equation is
done by trial and error. Second, we provide a useful policy recommendation to improve
upon the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Because the U.S. production function is more efficient,
our optimal contract would give a bigger salmon share to the U.S. than the current treaty
does. This policy change will improve the two countries’ welfare by 1.54%.
It is possible to extend our model and add the stock of the salmon population to our
repeated game as a new state variable. Naturally, the optimal sharing rule should depend
on this variable. We conjecture that our main finding (that the U.S. ought to get a bigger
share of the resource due to production efficiency) is robust to this extension.
We can also extend the current contracting framework to include three or more coun-
tries. This extension is useful in practice because many government negotiations are mul-
tilateral; for example, Western Pacific salmon are shared by China, Japan, Russia, and
South Korea. However, the challenge here lies in theory: the optimality equation with
three or more players is a partial differential equation and finding its boundary condition
may not be easy.25 We leave this extension to future research.
25In a multi-agent moral-hazard model, [25] reduces the optimality equation to an ordinary differential
equation by assuming that all agents are symmetric, i.e., they exert the same effort and receive the same
consumption. This assumption, however, is too restrictive for our application: the U.S. salmon industry is
more than 10 times bigger than Canada’s.
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3. BOOM AND BUST IN CHINA’S HOUSING MARKET
3.1 Introduction
China’s housing price has been growing steadily over the past decade. The average
growth rate of housing price is 10% from 2003 to 2013, far exceeding the 1.4% growth
rate of rents. The high price/rental ratio suggests that the current housing price cannot be
fully explained by the discounted sum of future rents, i.e., there is a bubble in the housing
market. Moreover, the rate of return from housing asset is quite different from the return
from capital. While the growth rate of housing price remains steadily at 10%, the return
to capital has been declining, reaching a low level of 5% in 2013. In an equilibrium,
investors holding both housing and capital must be indifferent between the two options.
No-arbitrage condition therefore implies that the high growth rate of housing price is also
coupled with high risk of price crash. This risk of bubble burst has drawn a lot of attention
from policy makers, social media, and academia.
Our paper studies bubble burst. Following [26], we model China’s housing market as
one of rational bubble in an overlapping generation framework. Young entrepreneurs use
their endowment to either purchase housing or invest in firm’s capital. The economy is
initially in a bubbly state where housing price is above the fundamental value. In each
period, a sunspot equilibrium decides whether the bubble continues to grow, or the bubble
bursts and housing price falls back to the fundamental value. In the latter case, less expen-
sive housing allows young entrepreneurs to allocate more resource to capital investment,
dampening the effect that housing bubble crowds out private capital.
Our model features another channel through which housing price may affect the econ-
omy. Data from 2003 to 2013 show that around 45% of China’s infrastructure investment
is funded by the government’s revenue from land auction to the private sector. This moti-
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vates us to model a government who chooses the level of infrastructure investment based
on its revenue from land sale. Clearly, a bubble burst will reduce land price and the govern-
ment’s infrastructure investment. What is less clear is the effect of lowered infrastructure
on China’s GDP. If the infrastructure investment is already excessive, then bubble burst
will improve production efficiency by reducing the excessiveness of infrastructure. On the
other hand, if infrastructure is inadequate, then bubble burst will make the situation even
worse.
To quantify the effects of housing price and infrastructure on the economy, we calibrate
our model to match growth rates of both the real GDP and housing price of China. Two
findings from our calibrated model are worth mentioning. First, we confirm the existence
of bubble in China’s housing market. Since housing price has been growing faster than
rents for a decade, bubble size has gone up from 3% of the housing price in 2003 to
32% in 2013. If this bubble were to crash in 2017, housing price will drop by 40% and
entrepreneurs’ total wealth drop by 16%. Second, we find that China’s infrastructure is
indeed overinvested. While the optimal ratio between infrastructure and private capital is
1:4.5, this ratio in China is 1:3.7 based on our estimates.1
We use the model to answer two important questions: 1) what is the consequence of
a housing market crash? and 2) how does the adoption of property tax affect housing
market? In the first question, we suppose a shock that eliminates the housing bubble
occurs in 2017, and then simulate the equilibrium dynamics afterwards. Unsurprisingly,
market price of all existing homes takes a big hit. Since newly built homes enter GDP,
China’s GDP growth rate decreases from 6% to 2.3% in 2017. This decline, however,
is not long lasting: China’s GDP after the crash of 2017 would overtake what would
have been achieved if the shock had not occurred by 2047. The reason for the quick
1China does not report the stocks of infrastructure or private capital, so a model must be used to estimate
them.
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recovery is that lowered housing price reduces the government’s revenue from land sale,
and consequently overinvestment of infrastructure can be resolved. With more capital
invested in non-housing sectors, higher output from these sectors makes up for the lost
value of new homes. In fact, China’s GDP excluding housing is unaffected by the crash of
2017, and by 2047 is higher than that with no crash by 5%.
To answer the second question, we suppose that Chinese government imposes a 1.5%
property tax on all homes starting from 2017. Even if the bubble does not burst, this policy
will immediately reduce the bubble size in 2017 because the after-tax return of owing a
home is lower. In fact, the rent-to-price ratio goes from 1.3% to 3.2%. More importantly,
we find that output of non-housing sectors increases more than it does under the crash of
housing bubble. The reason is that government’s revenue (and its infrastructure invest-
ment) are affected differently in the two cases. In the case of bubble burst, the reduction
of revenue is so dramatic that infrastructure goes from overinvestment to underinvestment.
In the case of property tax, however, the reduction of government revenue is less dramatic
because the property tax revenue partially offset the loss in land-sale revenue.
Related literature Our paper is closely related to [27]. Both papers treat Chinese
housing as an asset bubble and analyze the movement of housing price in rational bubble
framework. There are, however, three differences between our paper and [27]. First, the
only effect of housing bubble in [27] is to crowd out the investment on productive capital
and slow down capital accumulation. In addition to that effect, our paper also studies the
infrastructure effect that housing bubble increases the government’s land-auction income
and enhances its infrastructure investment. Second, in [27], capital return is constant dur-
ing the first stage of the economy. In our model, capital return can vary overtime, which is
more consistent with the fact that Chinese capital return dropped in the last decade. Third,
our model assumes a nonzero probability of bubble burst in each period. This assumption
helps us match the housing price dynamics documented in [28].
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There is a large literature studying how bubble burst affects the economy, including
[29], [30], [31], and [32]. A common theme of these papers is the focus on firms’ credit
constraints. In these papers, housing assets are used by firms as collateral and a bubble
burst tightens the firms’ credit constraints, forcing them to take inefficiently low invest-
ment. Although credit constraint is important in understanding bubble burst in the 1989
Japanese housing market and the 2007 U.S. housing market, it is less so in China for
two reasons. First, the chance that bubble burst triggers a banking crisis is low because
mortgage loans in China require high down payments ([28]). Second, large state owned
enterprises do not rely on housing to get loans while most private enterprises are excluded
from the financial market (see [33]).
Our paper is also related to a large literature on government’s expenditure and eco-
nomic growth, e.g., [34], [35], [36], [37], [38]. As in the literature, efficiency in our model
requires a good balance between infrastructure investment and private capital investment.
Our model differs from the literature in modelling the government’s budget constraint.
While infrastructure is purely funded by tax revenue in the literature, here it is also funded
by government’s sale of a bubbly asset. We emphasize this channel because almost one
fourth of Chinese government’s income comes from land sale.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the basic model, and char-
acterize its equilibrium with housing bubbles. Section 3.3 extends the basic model with
population and technology growth. The extended model is calibrated in Section 3.4, and
used in Section 3.5 to study the consequence of a bubble burst and the adoption of property
tax. Section 3.6 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs of all the results.
3.2 Basic Model
We follow [26] to build an overlapping-generation model. In this basic model, there
are no population growth or technology improvement. Moreover, we assume housing is a
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pure bubble to simplify our analysis. All these assumptions are relaxed in the next section,
where we do calibration.
3.2.1 Environment
There are three types of agents in this model: workers, entrepreneurs and a govern-
ment. Workers and entrepreneurs live for two periods. Each period, a unit measure of new
workers and entrepreneurs enter the model to replace the old. Young workers have one
unit of inelastic labor. After receiving wage income, workers decide their consumptions
and savings. They are out of capital market and housing market. The only way to save is
to purchase risky-free government bond. Their optimization problem is
max log(cw1t) + ρ log(c
w
2t)
s.t. cw1t + bt = wt,
cw2t = R
fbt,
where cw1t and c
w
2t are consumptions for workers born in period t, ρ is the discount factor,
wt is wage, bt is the holding of risk-free bond, and Rf is the exogenous interest rate set by
the government.
To understand entrepreneurs’ problem, we first describe the dynamics of housing price
Qt. In this section, housing does not generate rents and therefore is a pure bubble. People
buy it only because they can resell it in the future. The economy is either in a bubbleless
state (Qt = 0), or in a bubbly state (Qt > 0). If Qt = 0, then Qs = 0 for all s ≥ t (i.e., the
bubbleless state is absorbing). If Qt > 0, then the bubble bursts with probability 1 − p in
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period t+ 1:
Qt+1 =
 Q
b
t+1 > 0, with prob p;
0, with prob 1− p.
How Qbt+1 depends on Qt is endogenous and will be studied below.
Entrepreneurs can invest in both capital and housing. They are risk neutral and only
care about their second-period consumption. Each young entrepreneur inherits an initial
wealth of mt from the older generation. His problem is
max E[ce2t]
s.t. kt+1 +Qtht = mt,
ce2t = Rt+1kt+1 +Qt+1(1− δ)ht,
where ht is the amount of house a young entrepreneur purchases, kt+1 is the investment in
his firm, Rt+1 is the capital return rate at time t+1, and δ is the depreciation rate of house.
Each old entrepreneur owns a firm after investment of kt. The firm’s production func-
tion depends on the aggregate infrastructure level, At, as follows
yt = Aˆ
θ
tk
α
t l
1−α
t ,
where kt and lt are each firm’s capital and labor. Aˆt := At
Kβt L
1−β
t
is the aggregate infras-
tructure level adjusted for congestion effect. red We follow [37] to build this production
function. As [37] points out, in many cases, such as highways, utilities, and bridges, pro-
ductivity of infrastructure would decrease when more people or firms use them. Thus we
assume the productivity of infrastructure should be adjusted by the aggregate capital Kt
and aggregate labor Lt.
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As in [37], we assume
Assumption 2. α− βθ > 0 and α + (1− β)θ ≤ 1.
The first inequality guarantees the marginal return of capital is positive. The second
inequality guarantees the return on the whole reproductive part (infrastructure and capital)
is weakly decreasing. After production, old entrepreneurs pay tax to government at rate τ
and a fixed fraction ψ of post-tax production to young entrepreneurs as their initial wealth,
i.e., mt = ψ(1− τ)yt. The remainder is dividend, which old entrepreneurs consume. The
old entrepreneur’s optimization problem is
Dt = max
lt
[(1− τ)(1− ψ)Aˆθtkαt (lt)1−α − wtlt],
= Rtkt,
where Dt is dividend entrepreneur gets at time t, and Rt is capital return.
Capital in the economy evolves as
kt+1 = (1− φt)mt = (1− φt)(1− τ)ψyt, (3.1)
where φt := Qthtkt+1+Qtht denotes the fraction of housing in young entrepreneurs’ portfolio.
A government supplies ∆Ht units of housing to the market exogenously, and also
invests in infrastructure. The government budget constraint is
At+1 = (τ − e)AˆθtKαt +Qt∆Ht, (3.2)
where e is the ratio of government expenditure on some public good other than infrastruc-
ture. We assume full depreciation of both capital and infrastructure in our basic model for
convenience. All the properties shown will continue to hold when the depreciation rate is
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smaller than 1. The total amount of houses Ht evolves as
Ht+1 = ∆Ht + (1− δ)Ht. (3.3)
To guarantee the steady state and the sustainable bubble exist, we assume
lim
t→∞
gt = 1,
where gt :=
Ht+1
Ht
.
3.2.2 Equilibrium
This subsection characterizes equilibrium of the economy. We start with its definition.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a sequence of consumptions {cw1t, cw2t, c2t}∞t=0, savings {bt, kt, ht}∞t=0,
labor supply/demand {lt}∞t=0, infrastructure {At}∞t=0 and prices {wt, Rt, Qt}∞t=0 such that
1) workers and entrepreneurs maximize life-time utilities, 2) firms maximize profits, 3)
government’s budget constraint is satisfied, and 4) the labor, capital, and housing markets
clear. In particular, we have
• lt = 1,∀t because labor supply is inelastic;
• first-order conditions for firms’ profit maximization problem (after imposing lt = 1):
wt = (1− α)(1− τ)(1− ψ)Yt
Lt
= (1− α)(1− τ)(1− ψ)AˆθtKαt , (3.4)
Rt = α(1− τ)(1− ψ) Yt
Kt
= α(1− τ)(1− ψ)AˆθtKα−1t ; (3.5)
• non-arbitrage condition for young entrepreneurs to invest in both housing and cap-
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ital:
pQbt+1(1− δ)
Qbt
= Rt+1. (3.6)
The main characterization result of this section is as follows.
Proposition 1. Consider an economy with initial condition {k0, A0, H0}. If (1−ψ)α(1−δ)ψ ≥ p,
then no bubbly equilibrium exists, i.e., Qt = 0 for all dates and states in the equilibrium.
Otherwise, if (1−ψ)α
(1−δ)ψ < p, then a continuum of equilibria exist depending on the initial Q0.
There is a Qˆb0 > 0 such that
1. if 0 < Q0 < Qˆb0, then a bubbly equilibrium exists in which limt→∞Q
b
t = 0;
2. if Q0 = Qˆb0, then a bubbly equilibrium exists in which limt→∞Q
b
t > 0;
3. if Q0 > Qˆb0, then no equilibrium exists.
The intuition for Proposition 1 can be explained in two steps. First, we explain how
the long-run size of the bubble, limt→∞Qbt , depends on the initial Q
b
0 = Q0. With higher
Qb0, more private capital K1 is crowded out, and capital return R1 becomes higher. Non-
arbitrage condition (3.6) then implies a higher growth rate Q
b
1
Qb0
. Using this argument for all
the future dates, we conclude that higher Q0 increases the growth rate
Qbt+1
Qbt
for all t. Now,
let Qˆb0 be the initial bubble size starting from which the bubble stabilizes in the long run,
i.e., 0 < limt→∞Qbt < ∞. Then in case (i), lower Q0 and lower growth rates imply the
bubble eventually disappears, while in (iii), higher Q0 and higher growth rates imply the
bubble eventually explodes. Note that in (iii) equilibrium does not exist with exploding
housing price, because young entrepreneurs, whose initial wealth are bounded, eventu-
ally cannot afford to purchase the bubble (thus violating the market-clearing condition in
housing).
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Second, we discuss two senses in which condition (1−ψ)α
(1−δ)ψp < 1 is needed for the exis-
tence of bubbly equilibrium. On the one hand, because the bubble size φ∗ := limt→∞ φt in
a bubbly steady state equals 1− (1−ψ)α
(1−δ)ψp , we need 1− (1−ψ)α(1−δ)ψp > 0 for bubbly steady state to
exist.2 On the other hand, because (1−ψ)α
ψ
is the long-run real interest rate in the bubbleless
economy,3 the condition (1−ψ)α
(1−δ)ψp < 1 is nothing more than an upper bound imposed on
this real interest rate, which is a standard assumption in the literature for bubbles to exist.
As pointed out by [26], only if the rate of return from capital (in the absence of bubble) is
sufficiently low, bubbly assets may enter the economy as an alternative channel to save.
3.2.3 Two Steady States
There are two steady states in our model: one is bubbleless and the other is bubbly. In
this subsection, we compare output levels of the two steady states.
In both steady states, output Y ∗, infrastructure A∗ and private capital K∗ satisfy
Y ∗ = (A∗)θ(K∗)α−βθ,
A∗ = (τ − e+ δ(1− τ)ψφ∗)Y ∗,
K∗ = ψ(1− τ)(1− φ∗)Y ∗.
Bubble size φ∗ equals some positive value φb > 0 in the bubbly steady state, but is zero
in the bubbleless steady state. Clearly, large bubble size φ∗ enhances A∗ by crowding out
private capital K∗.
2That φ∗ = 1− (1−ψ)α(1−δ)ψp can be derived from the following conditions:
K∗ = ψ(1− τ)(1− φ∗)Y ∗, (3.7)
R∗ = α(1− τ)(1− ψ) Y
∗
K∗
, (3.8)
p(1− δ) = R∗, (3.9)
where (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) are long-run limits of (3.1), (3.5), and (3.6).
3That R∗ = (1−ψ)αψ in the bubbleless economy can be derived from (3.7), (3.8), and φ
∗ = 0.
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Output in the bubbly steady state is higher than that in the bubbleless steady state if
and only if
(
1 +
δ(1− τ)ψ
τ − e φb
)θ
(1− φb)α−βθ > 1. (3.10)
In (3.10), δ(1−τ)ψ
τ−e φb captures the (percentage) increase in infrastructure funded by the sale
of bubbly asset, while −φb captures the decrease in capital. To obtain further intuition,
suppose φb is small, say 1%. Then the change of the first term,
(
1 + δ(1−τ)ψ
τ−e φb
)θ
, from
its bubbleless-state value of one is δ(1−τ)ψ
τ−e θ percent, while the change of the second term,
(1− φb)α−βθ, is −(α− βθ) percent. Then (3.10) holds if and only if
δ
ψ(1− τ)
τ − e
θ
α− βθ > 1.
The intuition for the above is as follows. First, ψ(1−τ)
τ−e is the ratio
K∗
A∗ in the bubbleless
steady state, and a higher ratio increases the return of reallocating capital to infrastructure
through bubble, making the bubbly output higher than the bubbleless output. Second, θ
α−βθ
is the ratio between the elasticities of infrastructure and capital. If infrastructure is more
elastic than capital, then again the return of reallocating capital to infrastructure is higher.
Third, the depreciation rate of housing, δ, is the ratio between new housing ∆H and total
housing H in any steady state. If one unit of capital is crowded out by bubble, only δ units
enter the revenue of the government and become infrastructure investment (the rest, 1− δ,
belongs to sellers of old housing units). That is, δ is the rate of transformation between
K∗ and A∗, and a higher δ increases the return of reallocating capital to infrastructure.
The above intuition continues to hold when φb is not small. In fact,
Corollary 2. Inequality (3.10) is more likely to hold with higher ψ(1−τ)
τ−e ,
θ
α−βθ , and δ.
Figure 3.1 further illustrates the dependence of outputs on the government expenditure
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Figure 3.1: Output of bubbly steady state and bubbleless steady state.
e. When e is closed to zero, all the fiscal income is used for infrastructure investment
and infrastructure is over-invested. The bubbly output is lower than the bubbleless output
because bubble worsens the over-investment problem. When e is close to τ , however, the
bubbly output is higher than the bubbleless output because the latter is close to zero when
the government cannot provide any infrastructure.
In [26] and [27], bubble only has the effect of crowding out capital, which certainly
lowers the output. In our paper, however, bubble also helps government accumulate in-
frastructure. Thus it is possible that the bubbly output is higher than the bubbleless output.
3.3 Extended Model
We build an extended model to better approach to the reality. There are four main
differences comparing to the basic model. First, in this extended model, we consider an
economy with population growth and technology improvement. The Population of both
workers and entrepreneurs grows at a constant rate 1 + η, and the labor efficiency grows
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at a constant rate 1 + ζ . Second, both workers and entrepreneurs live for T years, and
workers retire at the age J . Third, we consider house delivers real utility flow rt, thus
house has some fundamental value. The rent rt grows at a exogenous growth rate 1 + ξ.
Forth, capital and infrastructure depreciate at 1− δk and 1− δa.
The j-th generation workers’ optimal decision problem can be written as,
maxE[
T+j∑
t=j
ρ(t−j)log(cw(j, t))]
subjected to,
cw(j, j) + bw(j, j) = wj
cw(j, t) + bw(j, t) = wt +R
fsw(j, t− 1),when ∈ [j + 1, j + J ]
cw( j, t) + b
w(j, t) = Rfbw(j, t− 1),when t ∈ [j + J + 1, j + T ],
where cw(j, t) stands for j-th generation worker’s consumption at time t and bw(j, t) stands
for j-th generation worker’s saving at the beginning of time t.
The j-th generation entrepreneurs are born with initial endowmentmj , and choose their
portfolio between capital investment and housing investment. The entrepreneurs are risk-
neutral and care about their consumption in last period. Their optimal decision problem
can be written as.
maxE[ce(j, j + T ))]
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subjected to,
Qjh(j, j) + k(j, j + 1) = m(j),
Qth(j, t) + k(j, t+ 1) = Rtk(j, t− 1) + (Qt + rt)h(j, t− 1)(1− δ), t ∈ [j + 1, j + T − 1]
ce(j, j + T )) = Rtk(j, j + T − 1) + (Qt + rt)h(j, j + T − 1)(1− δ).
where ce(j, t) denote j-th generation entrepreneurs’ consumption at time t. h(j, t)
and k(j, t) stand for the quantity of housing and quantity of capital j-th generation en-
trepreneurs own at the beginning of time t.
A non-arbitrage condition in this extended model is
[pQbt+1 + (1− p)Qft+1 + rt](1− δ)
Qbt
= Rt+1,
whereQft is the fundamental price of housing, which is defined asQ
f
t ≡
∑∞
i=t+1
ri(1−δ)i−t∏i
j=tRj
.
Old entrepreneurs face similar problem in the basic model. The only difference is
that we consider depreciation rate of capital is δk and labor efficiency Et in this extended
model. The optimal problem faced by old entrepreneurs as
max
lt
(1− ψ)AˆθtKαt (Etlt)1−α + (1− δk)Kt.
The government’s budget constraints is
At+1 = (τ − e)AˆθtKαt + κQt∆Ht + (1− δa)At,
where δa is the depreciation rate of infrastructure capital and κ is the fraction between net
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revenue of selling land and the total value of newly built house.
3.4 Calibration
3.4.1 Parameters
Our calibrated model focuses on matching Chinese data during 2003-2013. Each pe-
riod in our model stands for one year in reality, and the model starts at 2003. There are
two types of parameters needed to be decided. The first type of parameters are chosen
exogenously and the other type are calibrated in the model.
We firstly introduce parameters chosen exogenously in this and next paragraphs. Sim-
ilar with [33] and [27], agents enter into the economy at age 22 and live for T = 50 years,
which is consistent with the average life expectancy 71.4 years from 2000 Chinese Popula-
tion Census. Workers retires after 30 years working. The population growth rate is 0.005,
which matches the average population growth rate during 2003-2013 from NBSC data set.
Rf = is set as 1.0175, matching the average one-year real deposit rate. ρ is chosen as
0.997 to match the average investment ratio.
On the production side, the capital income share α is chosen as 0.5, which is consistent
with [39]. θ is chosen as 0.1, which is estimated by [40]. Since we find β is no sensitive
in the model, thus we assume the congestion effect to capital and to population are the
same and β is conjectured as 0.5. Following [39], the depreciation rate of capital δk and
the depreciation rate of infrastructure δa are set as 0.1.
The growth rate of rent gr is set as 0.014 to match the average growth rate of rent during
2003-2013. The growth rate of housing gt is decided as following. In the first eleven years
we set gt = 0.07 to match the fact that quantity of house doubled during 2000-2010. After
the first 11 years, we think it seems impossible that such high growth rate of housing can
last for long term since Chinese growth rate of urban population has already decreased for
last decade. We assume the long-run growth rate of housing equals to the growth rate of
45
population, and the growth rate of housing follows an exponential attenuation function as
gt = (g0 − η)e−ξ(t−11) + η, where attenuation speed ξ = 0.07 to match the attenuation
speed of the urban population growth during 2003-2013.
After we introduce parameters chosen exogenously, now we show parameters esti-
mated in the model. ψ is chosen as 0.19 to match the capital return before tax 22 percent
in 2003. τ is chosen as 0.21 to match the capital return after tax 15 percent in 2003. e is
chosen as 0.16 to match the proportion of government expenditure (excluding infrastruc-
ture investment) out of GDP. The growth rate of labor efficiency ζ is set as 0.04 to match
10 percent Chinese average GDP growth rate during 2003-2013.
We use the possibility of bubble burst to match the growth rate of housing price. And
we assume the possibility of bubble burst degenerates in long run to guarantee the exis-
tence of bubble. For simplicity, we assume that the probability of bubble burst is a linear
attenuation function with time. The starting probability of bubble burst and ending time
are set as 1 − p = 0.17 and T = 15 to match the average growth rate of housing price
during 2003-2008 and 2009-2013.
The initial labor quantity and housing quantity are normalized as 1. The initial aggre-
gate capital level is set as 1.41 to match the capital-to-output ratio 1.26 in 2003. The initial
infrastructure is set as 0.68 to match the ratio of infrastructure to capital 0.48 in 2003 (see
[41]). Following [33] the initial wealth distribution of entrepreneurs is set as wealth dis-
tribution of workers in steady state. The initial housing rent is set as 0.017 to match the
proportion of newly built house value to GDP 4.5% in 2003.
3.4.2 Calibration Result
Our main calibration result is shown in Figure 3.2. In the left panel, we replicate the
path of capital return. Our simulated path is consistent with capital return data in [42].
Based on [42], capital return in China drops from 15 percent in 2003 to 5 percent in 2013.
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Figure 3.2: Return to capital and housing price in China.
Our simulated capital return drops from 15 percent to 5.8 percent, which reasonably well
matches the rapid decrease on capital return since 2003. Our simulated growth rate of
housing pricing drops from 13 percent in 2003 to 8.7 percent in 2013. The Decrease
on growth rate of housing price is only one half of the decrease on capital return, which
matches the growth rate of housing in [28]. The resilient growth rate of housing price is
the key prediction in our model.
In the Figure 3.3, we show GDP growth rate and infrastructure investment in our model
and in the data. The left panel of Figure 3.3 shows GDP growth rate. Our model can repli-
cate the average GDP growth rate as 10 percent during 2003-2013, and also the path that
the growth rate drops from the highest point over 13 percent to 7.5 percent in 2013. In the
right panel of Figure 3.3, we show the increasing proportion of infrastructure investment
to GDP. Both our model and the data suggest that this proportion increased dramatically:
in the data, it increased from 7 percent to 12.6 percent; in our model, it increased from 8.7
percent in 2003 to 11 percent in 2013. Our model may underestimate the high proportion
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Figure 3.3: GDP growth and infrastructure investment.
of infrastructures investment because after financial crisis Chinese government proposed
a large economic stimulus package (which is well known as “4 trillion project”). Much
fund from this project was invested into infrastructure building. This can explain the un-
derestimation after 2008 in our model.
In the Figure 3.4, our model predicts the proportion of bubble component to total
housing price. Through our simulation, the proportion of bubble component increases
dramatically from 5 percent in 2003 to 32 percent in 2013. This dramatic increase comes
from the fact that the average growth rate of housing price is around 10 percent while
the average growth rate of rent is only 1.4 percent. The growth of bubble proportion is the
main reason why our model can predict resilient growth of housing price: when the bubble
component is small, even if public predict the possibility of bubble burst, the growth rate
of housing price is not affected by this prediction and lower than capital return because
total housing return includes both growing value and rent; when the bubble component is
large, people’s expectation on the possibility of bubble burst becomes dominating power
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Figure 3.4: Bubble proportion.
to push the growth of bubble even higher to compensate for the risk people take.
3.5 Counterfactual Experiment
3.5.1 Crowding-out effect and Infrastructure Effect
To better understand how bubble affects the economy, we conduct a counterfactual
experiment to explore the two effects in our model. We assume an economy which is
almost the same as our calibrated economy except that at the beginning housing price
equals to the fundamental value. We compare this bubbleless economy with the bubbly
economy. In Figure 3.5, we compare the dynamic paths of capital and infrastructure in this
two economies. Relative to the bubbleless economy in 2013, capital in bubbly economy
is lower in 8.5 percent while infrastructure is higher in 6 percent. The crowding-out effect
lowers the output excluding housing in 4 percent while the infrastructure effect highers the
output excluding housing in 0.6 percent. Finally, the output excluding housing in bubbly
economy is 3.3 percent lower than that in bubbleless economy and the output including
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Figure 3.5: Two effects on GDP.
housing is lower in 1 percent.
3.5.2 Bubble Burst
In this subsection, we consider bubble bursts in 2017 and see how bubble burst affects
the economy.
First, Figure 3.6 illustrates how bubble burst affects housing price. After bubble bursts,
the housing price immediately drops in 40 percent to fundamental value, and the growth
rate of housing price changes from 6 percent to -37 percent. Bubble burst does not only
change the temporary price but also lowers the long-term growth rate. In the next 30 years
after bubble burst, the average growth rate of housing price is 1.9 percent, which is lower
than the average growth rate without burst 2.9 percent. This is due to the low rent growth
rate. On the balance growth path, growth of housing price with bubble burst is 2.6 percent,
which is lower than 4 percent the one without bubble burst.
Second, in Figure 3.7, we show how bubble burst affects GDP. After bubble bursts, the
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Figure 3.6: Housing price with and without burst.
GDP drops 3.5 percent comparing the level without bubble burst and the GDP growth rate
in 2013 drops from 6.2 percent to 2.5 percent. This is due to that the value of newly built
house takes in around 10 percent of GDP. When the price drops, newly built house looses
value and causes the GDP to drop. However, after the first year of bubble burst, the growth
rates of GDP with burst are higher than the ones without burst. The average growth rate
with burst in next twenty year is 0.5 percent higher than the average one without burst. Till
2036, twenty years after bubble burst, the GDP with burst is over the GDP without burst
for the first time. In 2047, GDP with burst is 1.3 percent higher than GDP with burst and
the output excluding housing is 5 percent higher than the one without burst.
The reason for that GDP with burst is higher than the GDP without burst in long run
is because infrastructure is over-accumulated in bubbly economy. In 2017, the ratio of
infrastructure stock to capital stock is 1:3.8, which is higher than the ratio of production
elasticity of infrastructure to the elasticity of capital, which is 1:4.5. The ratio between
two elasticities implies the ratio of optimal stocks of infrastructure and capital, when the
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Figure 3.7: GDP with and without burst.
transformation rate from capital to infrastructure is 1:1. In our model, the largest marginal
transformation rate is 1:1, which implies even under a conservative consideration, Chi-
nese infrastructure is over-accumulated. Moreover, we find that in 2047, 30 years after
bubble bursts, the ratio of infrastructure to capital is 1:6.5, which suggests in a bubbleless
economy the infrastructure investment is insufficient. To solve this problem, we suggest a
property tax on housing. We will give more details in next subsection.
Bubble burst also causes a huge wealth effect. In Figure 3.8, we show wealth loss for
all cohorts in 2017 economy. The cohort born in 1946 lose 16 percent of their wealth due
to bubble burst. The younger cohort suffers more due to bubble burst. For the cohort born
in 1994, their total wealth lose in 52 percent. The wealth loss for younger cohort comes
from not only temporal drop in housing price but also the continuous lower capital return
rate. The cohort born in 1995 lose less than the cohort born in 1994, because when bubble
bursts they do not hold any housing, thus their wealth loss only comes from the low capital
return.
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Figure 3.8: Wealth effect of bubble burst.
3.5.3 Property Tax
Chinese government hasn’t taken comprehensive property tax so far. In this subsection,
we test a case in which Chinese government tax housing with a constant proportion of the
total value of housing stock. In our benchmark test, the tax rate is set as 1.5 percent and
the tax starts at 2017.
In Figure 3.9, we illustrate how housing price changes after property tax is imposed.
The price of housing drops in 59 percent immediately comparing with the price without
property tax and the growth rate drops from 6.8 percent to -56 percent. The reason for
the drop of price is because former price is not an equilibrium price anymore. If the price
does not change, since the growth rate of housing price becomes higher now, total value
of housing would eventually be over the size of economy. Because of this, public have to
lower their expectation of housing price, and the price drops. One thing interesting is that
the drop of housing price when property tax is imposed is larger than the drop when bubble
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Figure 3.9: Housing price with and without property tax.
bursts. It is because after imposing property tax, the fundamental value also decreases.
After the price immediately drops, in the following ten years, the average growth rate are
lower in 0.3 percent than that without property tax, however, in the long term, the growth
rate of housing price converges to long-term economy growth rate, same as the one without
property tax.
In Figure 3.10, we show how the property tax changes GDP. Based on our simulation.
after the property tax is imposed, the GDP drops immediately in 5 percent comparing with
the case without property tax.In the growth rate of GDP drops from 6.2 percent to 0.9
percent. However, the long-term output level with property tax is higher than that without
property tax. Till 2032, 14 years after property tax started, the GDP level with property tax
is higher than that without property tax. In 2047, thirty years after property tax started, the
GDP is 2.7 percent higher than that without property tax and the output excluding housing
is 6.2 percent higher than that without property tax. One thing needed to be mentioned
is that the output level with property tax is higher than the output level with bubble burst.
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Figure 3.10: GDP with and without property tax.
It is because property tax helps government get fund to accumulate infrastructure. In
2047, infrastructure with property tax is 17 percent higher than that with bubble burst,
while capital with property tax is lower only in 0.3 percent than that with bubble burst.
Property tax not only lowers the crowding-out effect by lowering the housing price but
also compensates for infrastructural investment with new tax.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study China’s housing market in a rational bubble model framework.
We view our analysis as making three contributions. First, by allowing a probability of
bubble burst, our model can simultaneously account for the steady growth rate of housing
price from 2003 to 2013, and the declining rate of return of capital. Second, we quantify
the effects of a bubble burst, and find that, although the crash represents a big negative
shock to investors’ wealth, the effect on China’s real GDP is relatively small. The main
intuition is that housing market crash would not spread to the rest of the economy. Third,
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we recommend the adoption of property tax because property tax will 1) reduce housing
price even in the absence of a bubble burst, and 2) make up for the lost land-sale revenue
that the government needs for infrastructure investment.
Our analysis can be extended in two ways. First, we need to study concave utilities
for the entrepreneurs. Under concave utilities, entrepreneurs’ investment and consump-
tion decisions are endogenized, and the model can be used to study the impact of lower
wealth on entrepreneurs’ investment in capital. Opening up this channel may amplify the
negative effects of bubble burst on real GDP. Second, we can study the effects of other pol-
icy reforms on China’s housing market, such as property-purchase limitations and higher
down-payment ratios. These extensions are left for future research.
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4. SUMMERY
In this dissertation, I applies dynamic method studying two important public issues;one
is optimal design of Pacific Salmon Treaty; the other is Chinese housing price bubble.
On the Pacific Salmon Treaty, We extend the theory of continuous-time repeated games
to allow for side payments. We view our analysis as making two contributions. First, we
show that there are only two solutions to the optimality equation that characterizes the
boundary of the set of equilibrium payoffs. This technical contribution greatly simplifies
the calculation of the equilibrium set. In the literature, the search for the solution to the
optimality equation is done by trial and error. Second, we provide a useful policy rec-
ommendation to improve upon the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Because the U.S. production
function is more efficient, our optimal contract would give a bigger salmon share to the
U.S. than the current treaty does. This policy change will improve the two countries’
welfare by 1.54%.
On the Chinese housing price, we study it in a rational bubble model framework. We
view our analysis as making three contributions. First, by allowing a probability of bubble
burst, our model can simultaneously account for the steady growth rate of housing price
from 2003 to 2013, and the declining rate of return of capital. Second, we quantify the
effects of a bubble burst, and find that, although the crash represents a big negative shock
to investors’ wealth, the effect on China’s real GDP is relatively small. The main intuition
is that housing market crash would not spread to the rest of the economy. Third, we
recommend the adoption of property tax because property tax will 1) reduce housing price
even in the absence of a bubble burst, and 2) make up for the lost land-sale revenue that
the government needs for infrastructure investment.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF SECTION TWO
Appendix A.1: A brief history of the Pacific Salmon Treaty
The cooperative management of Pacific salmon between the U.S. and Canada can be
traced back to the 1930s. In 1930, the two governments signed the Fraser River Conven-
tion to equally share fish resources in the transboundary Fraser River. During the 1970s,
interception became a major problem undermining the two countries’ cooperation. Fishing
vessels from British Columbia caught many coho and chinook originating in Washington,
while vessels from Alaska harvested a lot of sockeye originating in British Columbia.
Solving this problem required that the two countries seek an agreement along the entire
west coast. In 1985, after 14 years of negotiation, they signed the initial version of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty. Based on this treaty, the two countries formed the Pacific Salmon
Commission to design fishing plans (fishing amount, fishing schedule, etc.) for both coun-
tries. However, after the initial version expired in 1992, they could not reach any new
agreement due to interception disputes. Consequently, there was no cooperative manage-
ment of Pacific salmon from 1992 to 1998. This period, during which numerous conflicts
occurred, is commonly referred to as one of fish war.
The U.S. and Canada signed a new version of the Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1999. The
new treaty has two features. First, its sharing rule is dynamically adjusted. Take sockeye
in the Fraser River for example.1 In 1999, the pre-season fishing plan gave the U.S. 22.4%
of the total allowable catch of sockeye. In 2000, this number was adjusted to 20.4%. The
adjustment was based on the sharing rule in the treaty, which took into account historic
1Sharing rules in several other transboundary rivers (such as the Stikine, Taku, and Alsek rivers) are
dynamically adjusted too.
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catch and other ecological data. Second, the new treaty allows one country to compensate
the other by making side-payments. In 1999, the U.S. made an implicit transfer to Canada
by providing $140 million to establish two restoration and enhancement funds (“Northern
Fund" and “Southern Fund"). The majority of the funds are spent on projects that enhance
Canadian salmon even if Canada did not supply the funds. In 2009, the U.S. transferred
$30 million to Canada to compensate for Canada’s loss from its fishery mitigation project.
The goal of this project is to downsize some Canadian fisheries.
The new Pacific Salmon Treaty has been well enforced. Fishing disputes similar to
those during the 1992-1998 fish war have not occurred since 1999.2 Moreover, data from
the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) show that overfish-
ing is no longer a serious issue in the salmon industry. More specifically, we use NOAA’s
data to compute the fraction of the overfished salmon stock within the total salmon stock,
and find that this fraction is small after 2000 (see Figure A.1).3 This evidence suggests
that the overall stock of salmon has been stabilized.4 Hence, in this paper, we assume for
simplicity that the total stock of salmon is constant over time.
Appendix A.2
A.2.1 The ratio of value added to revenue
For Canada, [45] provide data on the annual revenue and value added of Pacific salmon
from 1990 to 2011. We calculate the ratio of value added to revenue in each year, and then
average the ratios to get 22.5%. Since [45] is a report prepared for Canada’s Department
2The Pacific Salmon Commission, which carries out the Pacific Salmon Treaty, has never had its normal
activity disrupted since 1999. The Commission holds three bilateral meetings annually, and its next sched-
uled meeting is September 25-29, 2017 in Portland, Oregon. See http://www.psc.org/meetings/schedule/.
3NOAA assesses nationwide fish stocks of different species and areas every quarter, and uses informa-
tion such as fisheries landings, scientific surveys, and biological studies to determine whether a stock is
overfished.
4Unfortunately, we could not find complete time-series data about Canada’s Pacific salmon stock. Nev-
ertheless, [43] and [44] find that 96% and 95% of Pacific salmon in British Columbia were well managed in
2013 and 2014, respectively.
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Figure A.1: Fraction of the U.S. Pacific salmon stock in overfished status.
of Fisheries and Oceans, this data source is reliable.
For the U.S., we have not found nationwide data on value added of Pacific salmon.
Below is a list of various estimates based on regional data.
1. [46] contains the revenue and different categories of costs based on a 2002 survey on
Pacific salmon fishing in Bristol Bay. From the data, we calculate the value-added
ratio as 40.9%. Because salmon production in Bristol Bay is around one seventh of
the total U.S. production, we think these data are representative.
2. [47] construct estimators of the cost and revenue of salmon catching in Bristol Bay,
using multiple data sources including the 2002 survey in (i). Based on their estima-
tors, the average value-added ratio was 45.8% from 1999 to 2003.
3. [48] provides the revenue and costs from a 1973 survey in the Southeastern Alaska
Salmon Fishery. From these data, we calculate the value-added ratio as 48.1%.
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4. [49] provide data from a 1979 survey of all salmon fisheries in Alaska. The (incom-
plete) data suggest that the value-added ratio is at least 46%.
All the above estimates of the U.S. value-added ratio are higher than Canada’s 22.5%.
This suggests that allocating more salmon to the U.S. will improve total welfare. In order
to be conservative in estimating the welfare gain, we choose the smallest from the above
list (i.e., 40.9% in (i)) as the ratio for the U.S. in Subsection 3.2.1.
It is not surprising that the U.S. has a higher value-added ratio in salmon than Canada.
For the whole fishery industry, the average value-added ratios during 1999-2012 for the
U.S. and Canada were, respectively, 63.3% and 49.7%, and the ratio for British Columbia
was only 37.0%.5
A.2.2 Robustness check
In this subsection, we check the robustness of our results with respect to certain pa-
rameters. First, we try different values for the parameter of the cost of illegal fishing, µ.
In our benchmark calibration, we set µ = 0.84 using data from the European Union, but
the cost of illegal fishing in North America may be either higher or lower than 0.84. It
turns out that our numerical results are insensitive to µ. In particular, the welfare gains are
1.59% and 1.54%, respectively, under a lower µ = 0.5 ∗ 0.84 and a higher µ = 2 ∗ 0.84,
as opposed to 1.54% under the benchmark µ = 0.84.
Second, we redo the calibration and recalculate the welfare gain using a higher estimate
of the U.S. value-added ratio. We choose the highest estimate of 48.1% from (iii) in
Section B.1. Our results are reported in Table A.1.
The welfare gain of $92.51 million (or 2.37%) is larger than the $51.66 million (or
1.54%) in Table 2.4. This larger welfare gain is mainly because a more efficient U.S.
production function has made it more profitable to reallocate resources. To see this more
5Data sources: Fisheries of the United States (1999-2012) and Statistics Canada.
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Table A.1: Change of welfare measured in 1999 million USD when the U.S. value-added
ratio is 48.1%
Positive contract Optimal contract Difference
E
[ ∫∞
0
e−rt (p1t + p2t) dt
−∑∞k=1 e−rtkC] 3902.62 3995.13 92.51
E [
∑∞
k=1 e
−rtkC] 46.43 12.35 -34.08
E
[∫∞
0
e−rt (p1t + p2t) dt
]
3949.04 4007.48 58.44
E
[∫∞
0
e−rtp1tdt
]
3794.5 4000.19 205.69
E
[∫∞
0
e−rtp2tdt
]
154.55 7.3 -147.25
clearly, note that the welfare gain of $58.44 million due to the increase in p1t + p2t is
much larger than the $34.08 million due to the reduction of fixed cost, whereas in Table
2.4 the two welfare gains are close. The increase in the present value of p1t + p2t in Table
A.1 is again due to reallocating resources from Canada to the U.S., only on a bigger scale
here. The average catching weight of Canada has decreased to 0.81 million pounds in
the optimal contract in Table A.1, as opposed to 2.91 million pounds in Table 2.4. This
explains why Canada’s present value of p2t is $7.3 million, much lower than the $22.91
million in Table 2.4.
Appendix A.3: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2: If an IC contract (x, e,Q) with continuation payoff process W satisfies
eit > 0, then we can define an equivalent contract (x˜, e˜, Q˜) with identical payoff W˜ = W,
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but without stealing. In particular, define
x˜t := xt,
e˜it := 0, e˜jt := ejt,
Q˜it := Qit, dQ˜jt := dQjt + eitdt.
In the new contract, W˜it = Wit because player i is indifferent between stealing eitdt from
his opponent and being paid eitdt by his opponent. To guarantee W˜jt = Wjt, the new
contract may burn (µ − τ)eitdt units of the resource to increase player j’s total payment
expense at time t to (1+µ)eitdt = (1+ τ)eitdt+(µ− τ)eitdt. Then player j is indifferent
between incurring payment expense (1 + µ)eitdt and having (1 + µ)eitdt being stolen by
player i.
To finish the proof, we verify that (x˜, e˜, Q˜) remains IC. It follows from W˜ = W that
(β˜i1, β˜i2) = (βi1, βi2), i = 1, 2. Therefore the IC constraint 1 + β˜ii − (1 + µ)β˜ij ≤ 0
follows from (2.3).
Proof of Lemma 3:
1. A relaxed problem in which player 2’s incentive constraint is removed is
min
φ1,φ2
σ21φ
2
1 + σ
2
2φ
2
2
subject to 1 ≤ sin(θ)(φ1 + (1 + µ)φ2).
The optimal solution is
φ1 =
σ22
sin(θ)(σ22 + (1 + µ)
2σ21)
, φ2 =
(1 + µ)σ21
sin(θ)(σ22 + (1 + µ)
2σ21)
,
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which implies
σ21φ
2
1 + σ
2
2φ
2
2 =
σ21σ
2
2
(σ22 + (1 + µ)
2σ21) sin
2(θ)
.
Player 2’s incentive constraint is slack (and player 1’s incentive constraint is binding)
when
1 ≤ cos(θ)((1 + µ)φ1 + φ2) = cos(θ)
sin(θ)
(σ21 + σ
2
2)(1 + µ)
(σ22 + (1 + µ)
2σ21)
,
or
sin(θ)
cos(θ)
≤ (σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)(1 + µ)
σ22 + (1 + µ)
2σ21
.
Similarly, player 1’s incentive constraint is slack (and player 2’s incentive constraint
is binding) if
sin(θ)
cos(θ)
≥ σ
2
1 + (1 + µ)
2σ22
(σ21 + σ
2
2)(1 + µ)
.
If sin(θ)
cos(θ)
∈
[
(σ21+σ
2
2)(1+µ)
σ22+(1+µ)
2σ21
,
σ21+(1+µ)
2σ22
(σ21+σ
2
2)(1+µ)
]
, both constraints bind. The optimal solution
is
φ1 =
1+µ
cos(θ)
− 1
sin(θ)
(1 + µ)2 − 1 , φ2 =
1+µ
sin(θ)
− 1
cos(θ)
(1 + µ)2 − 1 .
This implies
σ21φ
2
1 + σ
2
2φ
2
2 =
a− b sin(2θ) + c cos(2θ)
sin2(2θ)
,
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where
a :=
2((1 + µ)2 + 1)(σ21 + σ
2
2)
((1 + µ)2 − 1)2 , (A.1)
b :=
4(1 + µ)(σ21 + σ
2
2)
((1 + µ)2 − 1)2 , (A.2)
c :=
2(σ22 − σ21)
(1 + µ)2 − 1 . (A.3)
2. The optimality equation can be rewritten as
κ(w) = max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− w)
r|φ(θ)|2
=
maxx∈[0,1] 2(cos(θ)p1(x) + sin(θ)p2(x))− 2N(θ)w
r|φ(θ)|2 .
So the optimal x∗ satisfies the first-order condition
cos(θ)p′1(x
∗) + sin(θ)p′2(x
∗) = 0. (A.4)
Since both p1(x) and p2(x) are concave functions, the above equation has a unique
solution x∗.
Proof of Lemma 4: First, the definition of x implies that (1 + τ)p1(x) + p2(x) ≥ (1 +
τ)p1(x) + p2(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Second, the definition of continuation payoffs in (2.1)
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implies
(1 + τ)W1 +W2
= E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt
(
((1 + τ)p1(xt) + p2(xt))dt− r(1 + τ)2dQ1t + rdQ1t
)]
≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt ((1 + τ)p1(x) + p2(x)) dt
]
= (1 + τ)p1(x) + p2(x).
If (W1,W2 = u2) is the promised payoff of some contract, then (1 + τ)W1 + u2 ≤
(1 + τ)p1(x) + p2(x), which implies W1 ≤ u1.
Lemma A.1. The right-hand sides of (2.10)-(2.12) satisfy the Lipschitz condition in the
open set B defined by
B :=
{
(w1, w2, θ, l) : u1 −  < w1 < u1 + ,
u2 −  < w2 < u2 +
u1 − u1 + 2
tan(θ)
,
0 < θ <
pi
2
, −∞ < l <∞
}
,
where  > 0 is a small positive number.
Proof: Equations (2.10) and (2.11) satisfy the Lipschitz condition because their derivatives
with respect to θ are bounded. To show the Lipschitz continuity of (2.12), define
m(θ) :=
1
|φ(θ)|2 ,
n(θ, w) :=
2
r
max
x∈[0,1]
N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− w) = 2
r
N(θ)((p1(x∗), p2(x∗))− w),
where x∗ is the optimal strategy given in (A.4). So the right-hand side of (2.12) is equal to
m(θ)n(θ, w). The rest of the proof consists of three steps.
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First, both m and n are bounded and continuous. Function n is bounded because N(θ),
p1(x
∗), p2(x∗), and w are all bounded in B; it is continuous because x∗ is continuous in θ.
To see that m is bounded and continuous for θ ∈ (0, pi
2
), recall from Lemma 3 that
m(θ) =

(σ−22 + (1 + µ)
2σ−21 ) sin
2(θ), if θ ∈ (0, θ1];
sin2(2θ)
a−b sin(2θ)+c cos(2θ) , if θ ∈ [θ1, θ2];
(σ−21 + (1 + µ)
2σ−22 ) cos
2(θ), if θ ∈ [θ2, pi2 ),
(A.5)
where a, b, and c are defined in (A.1)-(A.3). Function m is bounded on (0, θ1] ∪ [θ2, pi2 )
becausem ≤ max(σ−22 +(1+µ)2σ−21 , σ−21 +(1+µ)2σ−22 ); it is bounded on [θ1, θ2] because
sin2(2θ)
a−b sin(2θ)+c cos(2θ) ≤ 1a−√b2+c2 .6 Function m is continuous because Lemma 2 shows that
both φ1 and φ2 are continuous in θ.
Second, m(θ)n(θ, w) is Lipschitz continuous in w because the partial derivative of
m(θ)n(θ, w) with respective to w is bounded. In particular,
∂(m(θ)n(θ, w))
∂w1
= −2
r
m(θ) cos(θ),
∂(m(θ)n(θ, w))
∂w2
= −2
r
m(θ) sin(θ),
which are bounded because m is bounded.
Third, m(θ)n(θ, w) is Lipschitz continuous in θ. To show this, it is sufficient to show
that ∂(m(θ)n(θ,w))
∂θ
is bounded. Because (mn)′ = m′n+mn′ and both m and n are bounded,
it is sufficient to show that m′ is bounded and n′ is bounded.
1. m′(θ) is bounded. Differentiating (A.5) yields
m′(θ)=

(σ−22 + (1 + µ)
2σ−21 ) sin(2θ), if θ ∈ (0, θ1];
2 sin(4θ)(a−b sin(2θ)+c cos(2θ))+sin2(2θ)(2b cos(2θ)+2c sin(2θ))
(a−b sin(2θ)+c cos(2θ))2 , if θ ∈ [θ1, θ2];
−(σ−22 + (1 + µ)2σ−21 ) sin(2θ), if θ ∈ [θ2, pi2 ).
6a−√b2 + c2 > 0 because a2 − (b2 + c2) = 16σ21σ22/((1 + µ)2 − 1)2 > 0.
74
Functionm′ is bounded on (0, θ1]∪[θ2, pi2 ) becausem′ ≤ max(σ−22 +(1+µ)2σ−21 , σ−21 +
(1 + µ)2σ−22 ); it is bounded on [θ1, θ2] because
∣∣∣∣2 sin(4θ)(a− b sin(2θ) + c cos(2θ)) + sin2(2θ)(2b cos(2θ) + 2c sin(2θ))(a− b sin(2θ) + c cos(2θ))2
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2(|a|+ |b|+ |c|) + (2|b|+ 2|c|)
(a−√b2 + c2)2 .
Hence m′(θ) is bounded.
2. n′(θ) is bounded. The envelope theorem implies
n′(θ) =
2
r
(− sin(θ)(p1(x∗)− w1) + cos(θ)(p2(x∗)− w2)) ,
where x∗ is the optimal strategy in (A.4). Because w is bounded in B and x∗ ∈ [0, 1],
n′(θ) is also bounded.
Lemma A.2. 1. If a solution to (2.10)-(2.12) starts from (w1, w2, θ) = (u1, u2, θ), then
it is a straight line.
2. If a solution to (2.10)-(2.12) starts from (w1, w2, θ) = (u1, u2, θ), where u1 < u1,
then its curvature is positive (i.e., θ′(l) > 0) and θ(l) < pi
2
for all l ≥ 0.
Proof:
1. Define a straight line by (w1(l), w2(l), θ(l)) := (u1 − sin(θ)l, u2 + cos(θ)l, θ). This
straight line solves (2.10)-(2.12) because
max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− w)
r|φ(θ)|2 =
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− w)
r|φ(θ)|2
= 0 = θ′(l).
75
A solution to (2.10)-(2.12) must equal the above straight line because the solution is
unique.
2. First, we prove θ′(l) > 0,∀l ≥ 0 by contradiction. If u1 < u1, then the optimal
equation implies that θ′(l = 0) > 0. Suppose θ′(l∗) = 0 at some l∗ > 0. Then the
straight line that passes through w(l∗) and is parallel to T (θ(l∗)) solves (2.10)-(2.12)
from the initial conditions (w(l∗), θ(l∗)).7 It has zero curvature throughout. How-
ever, the original curve (w(l), θ(l)) also solves (2.10)-(2.12), and passes through
w(l∗), but has positive curvature at θ = θ. This contradicts the property that the
solution to (2.10)-(2.12) is unique.
Second, we show θ(l) < pi
2
,∀l ≥ 0 by contradiction. Suppose θ(l∗) = pi
2
at some
l∗ > 0. For any integer k, define lk by θ(lk) = pi2 − 12k . Since θ increases in l, {lk} is
an increasing sequence. Therefore,
1
2k+1
= θ(lk+1)− θ(lk) =
∫ lk+1
lk
m(θ(l))n(θ(l))dl
= m(θ(l))n(θ(l))(lk+1 − lk)
≤ m(θ(l))N(lk+1 − lk),
where l is a point in [lk, lk+1] and N is an upper bound for the bounded function n.
Because m is shown to be Lipschitz continuous in Lemma A.1, m(θ(l)) ≤ M(pi
2
−
7Denote (w1(l∗), w2(l∗), θ(l∗)) as (w∗1 , w
∗
2 , θ
∗). As in step (i), the straight line defined by
(w˜1(l), w˜2(l), θ˜(l)) := (w
∗
1 − sin(θ∗)(l − l∗), w∗2 + cos(θ∗)(l − l∗), θ∗) satisfies (2.12) because
θ˜′(l) = 0 = max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ∗)((p1(x), p2(x))− w˜)
r|φ(θ∗)|2 .
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θ(l)) for some M . Therefore,
1
2k+1
≤ m(θ(l))N(lk+1 − lk) ≤ M(pi
2
− θ(l))N(lk+1 − lk)
≤ MN(pi
2
− θ(lk))(lk+1 − lk)
= MN
1
2k
(lk+1 − lk),
which implies lk+1 − lk > 12MN for all k. This contradicts the assumption that
l∗ = limk→∞ lk is finite.
Proof of Lemma 5: Because the ODE system in (2.10)-(2.12) satisfies the Lipschitz con-
dition in B, the extension theorem (e.g., [Theorem 3.1, page 12]Hartman2002) states that,
starting from any initial condition in B, a unique solution exists and extends to the bound-
ary of B. In particular, if u1 ∈ [u1, u1] and the initial condition is (w1, w2, θ) = (u1, u2, θ)
and l = 0, then the solution extends to (w1(l+), w2(l+), θ(l+), l+) ∈ ∂B.
We show that w1(l+) = u1 − . The proof consists of several steps.
1. l+ <∞. In fact, l+ ≤ u1−u1+
sin(θ)
follows from
u1 −  ≤ w1(l+) = u1 −
∫ l+
0
sin(θ(l))dl ≤ u1 −
∫ l+
0
sin(θ)dl
= u1 − sin(θ)l+.
2. θ(l+) < pi
2
. Because l+ is finite, part (ii) of Lemma A.2 implies θ(l+) < pi
2
.
3. w1(l+) < u1 + . This follows from w′1(l) = − sin(θ) < 0.
4. u2 −  < w2(l+). This follows from w′2(l) = cos(θ) > 0.
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5. w2(l+) < u2 + cos(θ)
u1−u1+2
sin(θ)
. This follows from
w2(l
+) = u2 +
∫ l+
0
cos(θ(l))dl ≤ u2 +
∫ l+
0
cos(θ)dl
≤ u2 + cos(θ)
u1 − u1 + 
sin(θ)
< u2 + cos(θ)
u1 − u1 + 2
sin(θ)
,
where the second inequality follows from step (i), and the third inequality follows
from u1 ≤ u1.
6. w1(l+) = u1 − . Otherwise, (w1(l+), w2(l+), θ(l+), l+) /∈ ∂B.
Because w1(l+) = u1 −  and w1(0) = u1 ≥ u1, the intermediate value theorem
implies the existence of an L such that w1(L) = u1. It follows from w
′
1(l) < 0 that L is
unique.
The following lemmas A.3-A.5 are used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma A.3. Θ is a continuous function of u1 ∈ [u1, u1].
Proof: Since this proof considers solution curves of various initial conditions u1, we shall
write w1 as a function of both l and u1. Because the optimality equation satisfies the
Lipschitz condition, its solution w1(l, u1) is continuous in (l, u1) (e.g., [Theorem 2.1, page
94] [50]).
First, we show the L defined in Lemma 5 is a continuous function of u1 ∈ [u1, u1].
Because the point (L(u1), u1) satisfies the equation
w1(l, u1) = u1,
and ∂w1
∂l
= − sin(θ(l)) 6= 0, the implicit function theorem states the existence of an open
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set (u1 − , u1 + ) containing u1 and a continuous function L˜(u) defined on the open set
such that
w1(L˜(u), u) = u1, ∀u ∈ (u1 − , u1 + ).
Because the l that satisfies w1(l, u) = u1 is unique, L(u) = L˜(u) for all u in the neighbor-
hood of u1. Therefore, L is continuous at u1.
Second, because L(u1) is continuous in u1 and the composition of continuous func-
tions is still continuous, Θ(u1) := θ(L(u1), u1) is continuous in u1.
To simplify notation in Lemmas A.4-A.5, we expressw1 andw2 as functions of θ. That
is, w1(θ) denotes w1(l(θ)), where l(θ) is the inverse of θ(l).
Lemma A.4. Two curves w and w˜ start from initial conditions (w1(θ∗), w2(θ∗), θ∗) and
(w˜1(θ
∗), w˜2(θ∗), θ∗), respectively. Supposew1(θ∗) ≥ w˜1(θ∗),w2(θ∗) ≤ w˜2(θ∗),N(θ∗)w(θ∗) =
N(θ∗)w˜(θ∗), w solves (2.10)-(2.12), and w˜ satisfies (2.10)-(2.11) and
κ˜(θ˜) =
dθ˜
dl
< max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ˜)((p1(x), p2(x))− w˜)
r|φ(θ˜)|2 . (A.6)
Then κ(θ) > κ˜(θ), w1(θ) > w˜1(θ), and w2(θ) < w˜2(θ) for all θ > θ∗.
Proof: First, N(θ∗)w(θ∗) = N(θ∗)w˜(θ∗) and (A.6) imply κ(θ∗) > κ˜(θ∗). It follows from
continuity that κ(θ) > κ˜(θ) for θ near θ∗.
Second, we show that κ(θ) > κ˜(θ) for all θ > θ∗. Suppose not, let θ∗∗ be the first
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θ > θ∗ such that κ(θ) = κ˜(θ). Then
cos(θ∗∗)w1(θ∗∗) + sin(θ∗∗)w2(θ∗∗)
= cos(θ∗∗)
(
w1(θ
∗)−
∫ θ∗∗
θ∗
sin(θ)
κ(θ)
dθ
)
+ sin(θ∗∗)
(
w2(θ
∗) +
∫ θ∗∗
θ∗
cos(θ)
κ(θ)
dθ
)
= cos(θ∗∗)w1(θ∗) + sin(θ∗∗)w2(θ∗) +
∫ θ∗∗
θ∗
sin(θ∗∗ − θ)
κ(θ)
dθ
< cos(θ∗∗)w1(θ∗) + sin(θ∗∗)w2(θ∗) +
∫ θ∗∗
θ∗
sin(θ∗∗ − θ)
κ˜(θ)
dθ
≤ cos(θ∗∗)w˜1(θ∗) + sin(θ∗∗)w˜2(θ∗) +
∫ θ∗∗
θ∗
sin(θ∗∗ − θ)
κ˜(θ)
dθ
= cos(θ∗∗)w˜1(θ∗∗) + sin(θ∗∗)w˜2(θ∗∗),
where the first inequality follows from κ(θ) > κ˜(θ),∀θ ∈ (θ∗, θ∗∗), and the second in-
equality follows from
cos(θ∗∗)(w˜1(θ∗)− w1(θ∗)) + sin(θ∗∗)(w˜2(θ∗)− w2(θ∗))
= (cos(θ∗∗)− cos(θ∗))(w˜1(θ∗)− w1(θ∗)) + (sin(θ∗∗)− sin(θ∗))(w˜2(θ∗)− w2(θ∗))
≥ 0,
which further follows from w1(θ∗) ≥ w˜1(θ∗), w2(θ∗) ≤ w˜2(θ∗), cos(θ∗∗) ≤ cos(θ∗), and
sin(θ∗∗) ≥ sin(θ∗). Therefore, (2.12) and (A.6) imply
κ(θ∗∗) = max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ∗∗)((p1(x), p2(x))− w(θ∗∗))
r|φ(θ∗∗)|2
> max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ∗∗)((p1(x), p2(x))− w˜(θ∗∗))
r|φ(θ∗∗)|2
> κ˜(θ∗∗),
which contradicts the definition of θ∗∗.
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Third, w1(θ) > w˜1(θ) and w2(θ) < w˜2(θ) because
w1(θ) = w1(θ
∗)−
∫ θ
θ∗
sin(x)/κ(x)dx > w˜1(θ
∗)−
∫ θ
θ∗
sin(x)/κ˜(x)dx = w˜1(θ),
w2(θ) = w2(θ
∗) +
∫ θ
θ∗
cos(x)/κ(x)dx < w˜2(θ
∗) +
∫ θ
θ∗
cos(x)/κ˜(x)dx = w˜2(θ).
Recall that if a curve starts from (w1, w2) = (u1, u2), then Θ(u1) denotes the angle of
the curve when it crosses Y. The following lemma shows an important property of Θ.
Lemma A.5. If u < u˜ and Θ(u) = Θ(u˜), then Θ(λu + (1 − λ)u˜) > Θ(u) = Θ(u˜) for
λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Let w and w˜ be the solutions to (2.10)-(2.12) that start from (u1 = u, u2) and
(u1 = u˜, u2), respectively. Construct a curve h as the convex combination of w and w˜:
h(θ) = λw(θ) + (1− λ)w˜(θ).
First, curve h satisfies
κh(θ) < max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− h(θ))
r|φ(θ)|2 . (A.7)
To prove (A.7), we show the inequality (A.8) below, which is equivalent to (A.7).
max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− h(θ))
r|φ(θ)|2
=
2N(θ)((p1(x∗), p2(x∗))− h(θ))
r|φ(θ)|2
= λ
2N(θ)((p1(x∗), p2(x∗))− w(θ))
r|φ(θ)|2 + (1− λ)
2N(θ)((p1(x∗), p2(x∗))− w˜(θ))
r|φ(θ)|2
= λκ(θ) + (1− λ)κ˜(θ),
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where x∗ is the optimal solution in (A.7). Because function 1
x
is strictly convex in x,
(
max
x∈[0,1]
2N(θ)((p1(x), p2(x))− h(θ))
r|φ(θ)|2
)−1
=
1
λκ(θ) + (1− λ)κ˜(θ)
< λ
1
κ(θ)
+ (1− λ) 1
κ˜(θ)
=
1
κh(θ)
, (A.8)
where the last equality follows from the fact that h is a convex combination of w and w˜,
and λdw
dθ
+ (1− λ)dw˜
dθ
= dh
dθ
.
Second, let wˆ be the solution curve starting from (u1 = λu + (1 − λ)u˜, u2). Lemma
A.4 shows that wˆ1(θ) > h1(θ) for all θ. In particular,
wˆ1(Θ(u)) > h1(Θ(u)) = λw1(Θ(u)) + (1− λ)w˜1(Θ(u))
= λu1 + (1− λ)u1 = u1.
Because the curve wˆ has not reached Y at angle Θ(u), the angle at which wˆ reaches Y,
Θ(λu+ (1− λ)u˜), is above Θ(u).
Proof of Theorem 1: First, we show that Θ(u1 = u1) = θ and Θ(u1 = u1) = θ. The
former is because L(u1 = u1) = 0 and θ(l = 0) = θ. The latter follows from the fact that
the solution curve starting from (w1, w2, θ) = (u1, u2, θ) is a straight line (see part (i) of
Lemma A.2).
Second, define u∗1 as a maximizer of function Θ on [u1, u1]. Such a maximizer exists
because Θ is shown to be a continuous function in Lemma A.3.
Third, we show that Θ is strictly increasing in [u1, u
∗
1]; the proof that Θ is strictly
decreasing in [u∗1, u1] is similar and hence omitted. By contradiction, suppose Θ(u
1) ≥
Θ(u2) for some u1 and u2, where 0 ≤ u1 < u2 ≤ u∗1. Because Θ is continuous in
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[u∗1, u1] and Θ(u
1) ∈ [θ,Θ(u∗1)], the intermediate value theorem states the existence of
u3 ∈ [u∗1, u1] such that Θ(u1) = Θ(u3). If u2 < u∗1, then u2 < u3 and u2 ∈ (u1, u3).
Lemma A.5 shows that Θ(u2) > Θ(u1) = Θ(u3), which contradicts Θ(u1) ≥ Θ(u2).
If u2 = u∗1, then Lemma A.5 shows that Θ(
u1+u3
2
) > Θ(u1) ≥ Θ(u2) = Θ(u∗1). That
Θ(u
1+u3
2
) > Θ(u∗1) contradicts the fact that u
∗
1 is a maximizer.
Lemma A.6. If w1 > u1, w2 > u2, and w = (w1, w2) ∈ ∂E , then there is no payment at
w.
Proof: By contradiction, suppose there is payment at w and (w˜1, w˜2) are the continuation
payoffs after payment; then
w1 + w2 = w˜1 + w˜2 − rC ≤ max
(w1,w2)∈E
w1 + w2 − rC
= u1 + u2
= u1 + u2,
where the last two equalities are (2.13) and (2.14). This implies that w is weakly below
the line segment connecting (u1, u2) and (u1, u2). If w1 +w2 < u1 + u2, then w is strictly
below the line, and hence in the interior of the triangle with vertices (u1, u2), (u1, u2), and
(u1, u2). Since the triangle is a subset of E , w is also in the interior of E , contradicting the
assumption that w ∈ ∂E . If w1 + w2 = u1 + u2, then define wˆ := w + (w − w∗), where
 > 0 is a small number and w∗ is a solution to max(w1,w2)∈E w1 +w2. Because wˆ is strictly
below the line connecting (u1, u2) and (u1, u2), the above argument shows that wˆ is in the
interior of E . Now w = 
1+
w∗+ 1
1+
wˆ is a convex combination of w∗ and an interior point
wˆ, and therefore, w is interior too. This again contradicts the assumption that w ∈ ∂E .
Lemma A.7. If u1 + u2 < max(w1,w2)∈E w1 + w2 − rC, then ∂E contains a horizontal
portion, a vertical portion, and a downward sloping portion.
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Proof: We first characterize the horizontal portion and the vertical portion of ∂E . Define ui
as in (2.5). The horizontal portion and vertical portion of ∂E are, respectively, {(w1, u2) :
u1 ≤ w1 ≤ u1} and {(u1, w2) : u2 ≤ w2 ≤ u2}. To see that these boundaries are non-
degenerate, we need to show ui < ui. Equation (2.13) and the assumption u1 + u2 <
max(w1,w2)∈E w1 + w2 − rC imply
u1 < max
(w1,w2)∈E
w1 + w2 − rC − u2 = u1 + u2 − u2 = u1.
Similarly, we can show that u2 < u2.
Then, we study the portion of the boundary from (u1, u2) to (u1, u2). This portion
stays above the straight line connecting the two points because E is convex. As we argue
in the text, the portion satisfies the ODE in (2.10)-(2.12). Recall that part (ii) in Lemma
A.2 shows that θ < pi/2 on any solution to the ODE in (2.10)-(2.12). Similar steps can
show that 0 < θ < pi/2 on any solution to the ODE. Therefore, the boundary from (u1, u2)
to (u1, u2) is downward sloping.
Proof of Lemma 6: First, we show that u1(w∗1) is strictly increasing in w∗1 and u2(w∗1)
is strictly decreasing in w∗1. We only provide the proof for u2(·) as the proof for u1(·) is
symmetric. For any two payoffs w∗1 > w˜
∗
1, let w and w˜ be the curves starting at (w
∗
1, S −
w∗1,
pi
4
) and (w˜∗1, S − w˜∗1, pi4 ), respectively. The proof of u2(w∗1) < u2(w˜∗1) consists of parts
(i), (ii), and (iii). During the proof, we shall write w2, θ, and κ as functions of w1.
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1. If w1 = w˜∗1, then θ(w1) > pi/4 = θ˜(w1). Furthermore, w2(w˜
∗
1) < w˜2(w˜
∗
1) because
w2(w˜
∗
1) = w2(w
∗
1) +
∫ w˜∗1
w∗1
w′2(w1)dw1
= w2(w
∗
1) +
∫ w∗1
w˜∗1
cot(θ(w1))dw1
< w2(w
∗
1) +
∫ w∗1
w˜∗1
1dw1
= S − w˜∗1 = w˜2(w˜∗1).
2. If there is some w1 such that θ(w1) > θ˜(w1) for all w1 ∈ (w1, w˜∗1], then w2(w1) <
w˜2(w1). The proof given below is similar to that in part (i).
w2(w1) = w2(w˜
∗
1) +
∫ w1
w˜∗1
w′2(w1)dw1
= w2(w˜
∗
1) +
∫ w˜∗1
w1
cot(θ(w1))dw1
< w˜2(w˜
∗
1) +
∫ w˜∗1
w1
cot(θ˜(w1))dw1
= w˜2(w1),
where the inequality follows from w2(w˜∗1) < w˜2(w˜
∗
1) in part (i) and the assumption
that θ(w1) > θ˜(w1) for all w1 ∈ (w1, w˜∗1].
3. We show θ(w1) > θ˜(w1) for all w1 ∈ [u1, w˜∗1] by contradiction. Suppose not, let
w1 be the largest w1 < w˜∗1 such that θ(w1) = θ˜(w1). That is, θ(w1) > θ˜(w1)
for all w1 ∈ (w1, w˜∗1] and θ(w1) = θ˜(w1) for w1 = w1. Then part (ii) implies
w2(w1) < w˜2(w1). Therefore, N(θ(w1))(w1, w2(w1)) < N(θ˜(w1))(w1, w˜2(w1))
and κ(w1) > κ˜(w1).
On the other hand, dθ
dw1
≥ dθ˜
dw1
at w1 = w1 because θ(w1) > θ˜(w1) for all w1 ∈
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(w1, w˜
∗
1] and θ(w1) = θ˜(w1) for w1 = w1. Therefore,
κ(w1) =
dθ
dl
=
dθ
dw1
dw1
dl
= − dθ
dw1
sin(θ(w1)) ≤ − dθ˜
dw1
sin(θ˜(w1)) = κ˜(w1),
which contradicts the inequality κ(w1) > κ˜(w1) shown above. Therefore, θ(w1) >
θ˜(w1) for all w1 ∈ [u1, w˜∗1] and by part (ii), w2(u1) < w˜2(u1). This finishes the
proof because u2(w∗1) = w2(u1) and u2(w˜
∗
1) = w˜2(u1).
Second, we show the existence and the uniqueness of w∗1 that satisfies u1 + u2(w
∗
1) =
u1(w
∗
1) + u2. It follows from
lim
w∗1↓u1
u2(w
∗
1) = S − u1, lim
w∗1↑S−u2
u1(w
∗
1) = S − u2
that
lim
w∗1↓u1
u1(w
∗
1) + u2 < (S − u2) + u2 = lim
w∗1↓u1
u2(w
∗
1) + u1,
lim
w∗1↑S−u2
u1(w
∗
1) + u2 = (S − u2) + u2 > lim
w∗1↑S−u2
u2(w
∗
1) + u1.
The above inequalities and the intermediate value theorem imply the existence of a w∗1
satisfying u1 + u2(w
∗
1) = u1(w
∗
1) + u2. The uniqueness follows from the monotonicity of
u1(w
∗
1)− u2(w∗1) in w∗1, and the monotonicity is shown in the first step.
Proof of Theorem 2: We can express equation (2.17) equivalently as
1 +B(D − S)S −
√
1 + 2B(D − S)S = rCB(D − S). (A.9)
The rest of this proof consists of five steps.
First, g(S) := 1 +B(D − S)S −√1 + 2B(D − S)S is symmetric around D/2. It is
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increasing on [0, D/2] because
g′(S) =
(
1− 1√
1 + 2B(D − S)S
)
B(D − 2S) > 0, ∀S ∈ (0, D/2).
Second, there is a cutoff S∗ ∈ (0, D/2) such that g is convex in (0, S∗) and concave in
(S∗, D/2). The second derivative of g is
g′′(S) = −2B
(
1− 1√
1 + 2B(D − S)S
)
+
1
(
√
1 + 2B(D − S)S)3B
2(D − 2S)2
=
B2(D − 2S)2 − 2B(1 + 2B(D − S)S)(√1 + 2B(D − S)S − 1)
(
√
1 + 2B(D − S)S)3 . (A.10)
It is easy to verify that g′′(S = 0) > 0 and g′′(S = D/2) < 0. Moreover, the numerator
in (A.10) is monotonically decreasing in S ∈ (0, D/2). Therefore, there is a cutoff S∗ ∈
(0, D/2) such that
g′′(S)

> 0, if S ∈ (0, S∗);
< 0, if S ∈ (S∗, D − S∗);
> 0, if S ∈ (D − S∗, D).
Third, generically, (A.9) has two or more solutions in (0, D) if it has at least one
solution.8 Suppose S is the largest solution; then there should be another solution below S.
To see this, note that g is below rCB(D−S) when S is close to D, since g′(S = D) = 0.
That means g stays below the straight line rCB(D−S) for all S ∈ (S,D) and stays above
the straight line for S slightly below S. But g(S = 0) = 0 is below the straight line, which
means there is another solution below S.
Fourth, if S ∈ (D − S∗, D) is a solution, then g(S) > rCB(D − S) for all S ∈
8We will ignore the case where (A.9) has no solution. In this case, C is so large that no feasible contract
exists except autarky.
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[D − S∗, S). This follows from the convexity of g on [D − S∗, D] and the fact that D is
also a solution. In particular, g is above the straight line at S = D − S∗.
Fifth, suppose S and S are, respectively, the smallest and the largest solutions in (0, D).
We show that no other solution exists between S and S. There are three possibilities:
1. S ∈ (0, S∗). Then S > D − S∗ because g(S) > g(S). The fourth step and
S ∈ (D− S∗, D) imply that g(S) is above the straight line for all S ∈ (D− S∗, S).
g(S) is above the straight line for all S ∈ (S, S∗] because g is increasing but the
straight line is decreasing. g(S) is above the straight line for all S ∈ [S∗, D − S∗]
because g is concave and both g(S∗) and g(D − S∗) are above the straight line.
2. S ∈ [S∗, D − S∗]. If S ∈ [S∗, D − S∗], then the conclusion follows from the
concavity of g. If S ∈ (D − S∗, D), then the proof is similar to that in part (i).
3. S ∈ (D − S∗, D). Then S ∈ (D − S∗, D). But the fourth step implies g(S) >
rCB(D − S) for all S ∈ [D − S∗, S). This contradicts the assumption that S ∈
(D − S∗, D) is a solution.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF SECTION THREE
Proof of Proposition 1
In any bubbly equilibrium
Qbt+1Ht+1
QbtHt
=
φt+1Rt+1Kt+1
φtRtKt
,
Rt+1gt
(1− δ)p =
φt+1Rt+1Kt+1
φt
Kt+1(1−ψ)α
(1−φt)ψ
,
φt+1
φt
=
(1− ψ)αgt
(1− δ)ψ(1− φt)p =
zgt
(1− φt) , (B.1)
where z ≡ (1−ψ)α
(1−δ)ψp . And it is trivial that in a bubbly steady state, φ
∗ = 1 − z. Equation
(B.1) is important to understand the dynamics of bubble. The left part of this chapter is
how we rely on Equation (B.1) to prove Proposition 1, and it includes the following six
lemmas.
Lemma B.1. In any equilibrium, {φt} converge to either bubbly steady state or bubbleless
steady state.
Proof: First, we argue that the sequence {φt} has a limitation. We prove it by contra-
diction. Assume there is a sequence {φt} which is not convergent. Define two sequences
{gt} ≡ sup({gt+i}i=∞i=0 ) and {gt} ≡ inf({gt+i}i=∞i=0 ). At time t, if φt > 1 − zgt, then
zg
t
1−φt > 1 while φt+i ≥ [
zg
t
1−φt ]
iφt for any i > 0. The sequence will finally excess 1. And if
φt < 1 − zgt, then zgt1−φt < 1 while φt+i ≤ [
zgt
1−φt ]
iφt for any i > 0. Finally, the sequence
will converge to zero. Thus φt ∈ [1 − zgt, 1 − zgt]. Since this should be held for any t,
limt→∞[1 − zgt] ≤ limt→∞φt ≤ limt→∞[1 − zgt], and limt→∞φt = 1 − z. It is contra-
dicted with the assumption {φt} which is not convergent. By this analysis, we can also
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find {φt} will converge to either bubbly steady state φˆ∗ = 1− z or bubbleless steady state
0.
Lemma B.2. If φt > φ′t, then φt+i > φ′t+i for any i > 0.
Proof: If φt > φ′t, by equation (B.1), we have φt+1 = zgt( 11−φt −1) > zgt( 11−φ′t −1) = φ
′
t.
By induction, we know φt+i > φ′t+i for any i > 0.
Lemma B.3. There is an nonempty, open, convex set Φ0 containing all φ0, from which
there are corresponding asymptotically bubbleless equilibrium.
Proof:To prove this lemma, we have three steps.
First we prove non-emptiness by arguing that when φ0 is sufficient small, there is
always a asymptotically bubbleless equilibrium. If {gt} is an increasing sequence, then
gt < 1. Choose φ0 < 1 − z, then φt+1φt < z1−φ0 < 1. Thus limt→∞ φt = 0. If {gt} is
a decreasing sequence, since {gt} converges to 1, there is a time T such that zgT < 1.
Choose φ0 < min[ 12(2zg0)T ,
1−zgT
(2zg0)T )
] satisfying that φt < 12 when t ∈ (0, T ] and φT <
1 − zgT . Then φT+i+1φT+i <
zgT
φT
< 1. Then {φt} converges to zero. And we can construct a
asymptotically bubbleless equilibrium with this {φt}.
Second, we prove the set is open. In step 1, we already show the set is open to the left.
Now, we show the set is open to the right. We argue that if φ0 ∈ Φ0 then φ0 +η ∈ Φ0 when
η is sufficient small. First we consider {gt} is increasing sequence. Since limt→∞ φt = 0,
there is a time T when φT < 1 − z. Choose η = 1−z−φT2( z
1−φ¯ )
T where φ¯ = max[{φt}T0 ], and
define a new sequence {φ′t} starting at φ0 + η. φ′T < φT + 1−z−φT2 < 1− z then any φ′T+i
will be smaller then 1 − z, and {φ′t} converges to zero.If {gt} is a decreasing sequence,
since { zgt
1−φt} converges to z, there is a time T after when
zgt
1−φt < 1 for all t. Choose
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η = 1−zgT−φT
2(
zg0
1−φ¯ )
T where φ¯ is defined the same as before. Starting from φt + η there is a new
sequence named as {φ′t}. φ′T < φT + 1−zgT−φT2 < 1− zgT and zgt1−φ′t <
zgT
1−φ′T for all t ≥ T .
Then sequence {φ′t} converges to 0.
Third, we prove convexity. Assume φ0 and φ′0 (φ0 > φ
′
0) are in Φ0, then for any
φ′′0 ∈ (φ′0, φ0) by lemma 2 φt > φ′′t > φ′t. We have 0 = limt→∞ φt ≥ limt→∞ φ′′t ≥
limt→∞ φ′t = 0. Thus, φ
′′
0 ∈ Φ0.
Lemma B.4. There is a φˆ0 as the supremum of set Φ0. Starting from φˆ0, there is an
corresponding equilibrium.
Proof: Since set Φ0 is a bounded open set, then there exists a supremum denoted as φˆ0
We claim there exists an equilibrium starting at φˆ0. Define a sequence {φt} starting at
φˆ0 satisfying equation (B.1). If there is no equilibrium starting from φˆ0, then there must
be some time T when φT ≥ 1. Now we claim the sequence {φ′t} starting at φˆ0 − η
also corresponds to no equilibrium when η is sufficient small. If φT > 1, then choose
η = φT−1
2∆T
where ∆ ≡ max({ zgt
1−φt}T−10 ). Then φ′T ≥ φT −
φT−1
2
> 1. If φT = 1, choose
η = zgT
2(zgT+1)∆T
. Then φ′T > 1 − zgT2(zgT+1) , which makes φ′T+1 = zgT
φ′T
1−φ′T ≥ 2 + zgT >
1.Since there is no corresponding equilibrium starting from φˆ − η, then φˆ0 − η /∈ Φ0. At
the same time, φˆ0 − η > φ0 for any φ0 ∈ Φ0 because Φ0 is a convex set. It is contradicted
that φˆ0 is the supremum of set Φ0.
Lemma B.5. There is a unique value of φ0, which corresponds to a bubbly equilibrium.
Proof:Since Lemma B.1, Lemma B.4 and Lemma B.5 imply that φˆ0 corresponds to a
bubbly equilibrium. Here we just prove the uniqueness. Assume that there are two initial
values φ0 and φ′0 starting from which {φt} and {φ′t} converges to the bubbly steady state.
Since limt→∞ zgt1−φt = 1 and limt→∞(1−φ′t) = z < 1, then there exist a time T after when
91
zgt
1−φt > 1− φ′t for any t ≥ T . We have φT+1 − φ′T+1 =
zgT
(1−φt)(1−φ′t)(φT − φ
′
T ) > φT − φ′T .
By induction, we know that φT+i − φ′T+i > φT − φ′T for any i > 0. Then φT+i and φ′T+i
at least one are not in (φˆ∗ + |φT−φ
′
T |
2
, φˆ∗ − |φT−φ′T |
2
), which is contradicted with that both
{φt} and {φ′t} converge to φˆ∗.
Lemma B.6. Starting from φ0 > φˆ0, there is no equilibrium.
Proof: By Lemma B.1, in any equilibrium ,starting from φ0 > φˆ0, the sequence {φt} can
only converges to 0 or φˆ∗. By Lemma B.5, starting from φ0 > φˆ0, the sequence {φt}
can not converge to φˆ∗. By Lemma B.2, the limitation of {φt} should be greater than or
equal to φˆ∗, thus {φt} can not converge to zero. So, starting from φ0 > φˆ0, there is no
equilibrium.
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